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BRINGING THE BOSSES TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIALS: THE PROBLEMS WITH
JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE
AND THE “CONTROL OVER THE
CRIME” APPROACH AS A
BETTER ALTERNATIVE
Dr. Juan-Pablo Pérez-León-Acevedo 1*

ABSTRACT
Similar to most international and hybrid criminal tribunals,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
used the doctrine or theory of Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE)
as a mode of liability when prosecuting and convicting those
most responsible, namely, state and non-state political and
military leaders, in cases of international crimes. Against such
background, the main research questions of this article are
whether JCE should be applied in cases of those most
responsible for international crimes and whether JCE should be
replaced by the “control over the crime” approach. Overall, this
article argues and finds two main points. First, JCE presents
major issues when applied to cases involving senior leaders.
Second, as done by the International Criminal Court, JCE
1 * Dr. Juan-Pablo Pérez-León-Acevedo is a researcher at PluriCourts: The
Legitimacy of the International Judiciary (Research Council of Norway Project
Number 223274), Faculty of Law, University of Oslo where he has also lectured
in international law courses and supervises master’s degree theses. He holds
a doctoral degree in social sciences (international law) (Åbo Akademi
University, Finland); a LLM degree (Columbia University, USA); a
professional title of lawyer and an LLB degree (Catholic University of Peru).
E-mail: j.p.p.l.acevedo@jus.uio.no A part of this article was done during the
author’s research stay at the Department of Criminal Law of the Max Planck
Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law (Freiburg, Germany). He
served in different capacities at the International Criminal Court, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, etc. The opinions
expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the above-mentioned institutions.
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should be replaced by the “control over the crime” approach since
this approach is an overall more coherent alternative in the
above-mentioned types of cases at international and hybrid
criminal tribunals. Compared to JCE, the “control over the
crime” approach as applied to cases involving senior
perpetrators of international crimes: i) allows a clearer
differentiation between principals and accessories to the crimes;
and, ii) in its manifestation as perpetration through another
person using an organized structure of power, is more suitable
to appropriately determine criminal liability of those most
responsible in large criminal enterprises.
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INTRODUCTION
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) used the doctrine or theory of Joint Criminal
Enterprise (JCE) as a mode of liability when prosecuting and
condemning those most responsible, namely, state and non-state
political and military leaders, for international crimes.2 The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) did the
same. Hybrid criminal courts, such as the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC),3 have followed the same path.
However, JCE presents two major problems.
First, the
distinction between principals and accessories to the crime is
based upon the state of mind of the defendant rather than his or
her acts. The importance of the contribution of the accused
person to the crime is hence undermined. Second, there are
important issues regarding individual culpability when JCE is
applied. On the one hand, the attribution of criminal liability to
political and military leaders is complicated in a large JCE. On
the other hand, the attribution of crimes which were not part of
the original criminal purpose and were committed by other JCE
participants is highly controversial, in particular when it comes
to special mens rea crimes.
The above-mentioned problems matter for two reasons.
First, a legal theory to distinguish those who are truly the most
responsible for international crimes from those who have just
accessorial participation is necessary. In order to proceed with
this distinction, the determination of criminal liability in
international criminal courts and tribunals will suit the
mandates of these judicial institutions, namely, to focus on
senior leaders. Second, in order to avoid impunity for senior
2 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 191, 193 (2d. ed. 2008)
(noting the specific cases in which the ICTY used JCE as a theory of
prosecution).
3 Id. at 330–31 (noting that hybrid courts are those which: i) have a mixed
composition, i.e., not only international but are also composed of national
judges of the country in which they are set up, such as in Sierra Leone or
Cambodia; ii) have jurisdiction not only over international crimes but also over
domestic offenses of the host country; and iii) were constituted by an agreement
between a state and an international organization such as the United Nations).
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leaders but in strict respect for the principle of individual
culpability, the adoption of a more consistent approach to
criminal liability is necessary.
Against this background, the main research questions posed
here are whether JCE should be used in cases of those most
responsible for international crimes and whether JCE should be
replaced by an alternative approach, such as the “control over
the crime.”4 Thus, the present article examines some of the main
problems with JCE in order to determine whether JCE should
be used to prosecute top military and political leaders at
international and hybrid criminal tribunals.
As will be
examined, the “control over the crime” approach considers that
principles to the crime are those who dominate the commission
of the crime because they decide whether and how the crime will
be committed.5 It is herein argued that the control over the
crime approach constitutes a better alternative than JCE for two
reasons. First, this approach takes into consideration that the
principals to the crime are not only those who physically carry
out the crimes, but also those who control or mastermind the
commission of the crimes, regardless of whether the senior
leaders are structurally and/or geographically remote from the
crime scene when the offence is committed, as they decide
whether, when, and how those crimes are perpetrated.6 This is
a “hybrid” approach that combines objective and subjective
approaches. Thus, it allows for a clear distinction between
principals and accessories when prosecuting leaders for
international crimes. Second, “the control over the crime”
approach—in its manifestation as perpetration through another
person using an organized structure of power—seems to be
legally and normatively more coherent when tracking down
criminal liability to the senior leaders in large criminal
enterprises and is applicable to any international crime.7 This
4 See infra Sections I.C, II.B, III.B (discussing what the “control over the
crime” approach is and how “principals” to a crime are determined).
5 See supra text accompanying note 4 (discussing what the “control over
the crime” approach is and how “principals” to a crime are determined).
6 See infra Section II.A (analyzing the distinction between principles and
accessories in criminal liability).
7 See infra Section III.A (noting the difficulties that come with using the
doctrine of joint criminal enterprise and why the “control over the crime”
approach is a better alternative).
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approach better embodies the notion that those higher up are
guiltier, which accords with moral sense and political reality.
Accordingly, the present paper has three main sections. The
first section provides the general framework—including
terminological/conceptual aspects, the importance of an
appropriate legal theory of criminal liability in cases of senior
leaders, and a presentation of the problems with JCE in these
cases. The second section discusses aspects related to the
distinction between principals and accessories in collective
criminality.
This section analyzes issues to reach such
differentiation when applying JCE and argues for “the control
over the crime” approach as an alternative. Lastly, the third
section examines specific individual responsibility issues. In
particular, the limits of the application of JCE in certain
scenarios, and conversely, the advantages of the “control over
the crime” approach are examined.
I. SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM
The first subsection of this section discusses the terminology
and the conceptual framework of those who commit
international crimes. Then the second subsection focuses on
analyzing the importance of finding a mode or legal theory of
criminal liability suitable to the goal of prosecuting and trying
senior leaders. Finally, the last subsection discusses why JCE
is arguably problematic to achieve the goal of prosecution and
trial of senior leaders.
A. Who Commits International Crimes?
A necessary starting point requires a determination of what
“direct perpetrator” means in international criminal law. Under
this body of law, “direct perpetrator” is understood as an
individual who physically carries out the objective elements of a
crime with the mental state required by the crime in question.8
8
See generally CASSESE, supra note 2, at 188 (noting that whoever
physically commits the crime is criminally liable); see generally HÉCTOR
OLÁSOLO, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SENIOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY
LEADERS AS PRINCIPALS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 69 (Mohammed Ayat et al.
eds., 2009) (stating that “[d]irect perpetration takes place when an individual
physically carries out the objective elements of a crime . . . .”); see generally

5
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This understanding may be criticized because the one who pulls
the trigger would somehow be the direct, more direct, or real
perpetrator. Therefore, the attribution of criminal liability to
those higher up becomes problematic. Indeed, common law, in
particular, American criminal law, does not refer to the category
of “direct perpetrator.” In common law, what is traditionally
called accessory before the fact to a felony is:
[O]ften the “man higher up” who is more of a social menace than
the underlings he employs. There is no sound reason why he
should not be called a “principal,” and treated as such for all
purposes, just as he would be if the crime were treason or
misdemeanor. The law in most jurisdictions is now to this effect.
In almost all jurisdictions today persons who were accessories or
principals at common law, except accessories after the fact, are
now classified as principals. The legal distinctions between the
classifications are today of little importance. However, the
terminology has remained to describe the functions or activities of
the actors rather than to distinguish legal culpability.9

The difficulty to attribute criminal liability to senior leaders
under the notion of “direct perpetrator” in international criminal
law is arguably increased by the reluctance of international
criminal law to incorporate conspiracy law. Nevertheless, the
meaning of “direct perpetrator” needs to be read in context. In
international criminal law, the “direct perpetrator” label, that
may in principle be understood as the “real” perpetrator, is
Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 767, 789 (Antonio Cassese et
al. eds., 2002) (discussing solitary [direct] perpetration as well as the difference
between ‘principals’ and ‘co-perpetrators’ of a crime); see generally Kai Ambos,
Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 743, 748 (Otto Triffterer ed.,
2d ed. 2008) (discussing perpetration, co-perpetration and perpetration by
means); see generally GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 119 (1st ed. 2005) (discussing how to define a “direct
perpetrator” in the international law context).
9
RONALD N. BOYCE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND
MATERIALS 505 (10th ed. 2007); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 664
(4th ed. 2003) (noting that “[t]he distinctions between the other three
categories [these three categories are: principal in the first degree, principal in
the second degree and accessory before the fact, accessory after the fact is
excluded], however, have now been largely abrogated, although some statutes
resort to the common law terminology in defining the scope of complicity.”).
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actually only one denomination within the broader notion of
“commission of the crime” which concerns criminal liability as a
principal.10 “Direct” perpetration is thus only a form of
“committing a crime.”
“Committing a crime” is found in the Statutes of the ICTY, 11
the ICTR12 and the ICC13 and involves criminal responsibility as
a principal. Articles 7(1) and 6(1) of the Statutes of the ICTY
and the ICTR, respectively, read as follows: “[a] person who . . .
committed . . . a crime referred to . . . in the present Statute,
shall be individually responsible for the crime.”14 When alleged
that a senior leader, such as Slobodan Milošević, is a principal
to the crime despite no involvement in the physical commission
of the crime, the ICTY Prosecutor normally used the following
language: “[b]y using the word committed in this indictment the
Prosecutor does not intend to suggest that the accused
physically committed any of the crimes charged personally.
Committing in this indictment refers to participation in a joint
criminal enterprise as co-perpetrator.”15 Thus, “committing”
was not limited to physical perpetration of the crimes.16
10 See generally Eser, supra note 8, at 789–95 (noting the context in which
“direct perpetrator” should be understood when determining criminal
liability); see generally Ambos, supra note 8, at 748–55 (discussing
perpetration, co-perpetration and perpetration by means); see generally
OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 69–70 (discussing direct and indirect perpetration).
11 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, May 25, 1993
[hereinafter ICTY Statute].
12 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 8,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
13 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 1002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
14 ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 7(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 12,
art. 6(1).
15
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second
Amended Indictment, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 28,
2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/040727.pdf.
16 Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. ICTY-05-87-PT, Decision
on Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Indirect Co-Perpetration, ¶ 30
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tdec/en/060322.htm
(defining
“committing” as follows: “that the accused participated, physically or otherwise
directly or indirectly, in the material elements of the crime charged through
positive acts or, based on a duty to act, omissions, whether individually or
jointly with others.”) (alteration in original); see also Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case

7

8

PACE INT’L L. REV.

Vol. 32:1

The notion of “direct,” “immediate,” or “physical”
perpetrator appears under the wording “as an individual” in
Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute: “[a] person shall be
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: (a) Commits
such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or
through another person, regardless of whether that other person
is criminally responsible.”17 This provision thus explicitly
considers the “direct perpetrator” notion as a mode of
“committing the crime,” namely, liability as a principal. This
same provision under “[c]ommits . . . through another person”
also refers to an “indirect perpetrator.”18 A senior leader that
“commits” a crime and becomes a perpetrator or principal
thereof does not need to physically carry out the objective
elements of the crime because it is sufficient that they are
physically carried out by the person that the senior leader uses
as a tool to execute the crime.19 In common law, this would
correspond to cases where a perpetrator who is traditionally
called “principal” in the first degree uses an innocent or
irresponsible agent as an intermediary to commit a crime.20
However, in international criminal law, this intermediary may
also be a responsible agent.21
The individual who orders the commission of crimes is
generally considered a principal in international criminal law.22
The ICC has however identified two meanings of “ordering”
No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 439 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
July 31, 2003) (providing an additional definition of “committing” in joint
criminal enterprises).
17 ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 25(3)(a).
18 Id.
19 Eser, supra note 8, at 793 (expressing that criminal liability extends to
a person who commits a crime through another person); see infra Section III.B
(discussing “direct” and “indirect” perpetrators in detail); see infra Section III.B
(discussing the “The Control over the Crime” approach to address individual
responsibility issues); see generally WERLE, supra note 8, at 123–24 (noting
that committing a crime through another person is a sufficient basis for
criminal liability under Article 23(3)(a) of the ICC Statute).
20 LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 664.
21
See infra Section III.B (discussing how Courts have held
intermediaries liable for actions ordered by Principals).
22 Eser, supra note 8, at 797; see generally Ambos, supra note 8, at 755
(noting that a person who orders a crime is not an accomplice to the crime;
instead, they are considered perpetrators).
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under its Statute. The first meaning is “ordering” as a form of
accessorial liability and is used to describe the act of a person in
a position of authority and one who uses that position to convince
another individual to commit an offence.23 The second meaning
of “ordering” corresponds to the situation of a leader in command
of an organization, who commits crimes “through another
person” and incurs liability as a principal since “[t]he highest
authority does not merely order the commission of a crime, but
through his control over the organization, essentially decides
whether and how the crime would be committed.”24
Therefore, the expression “direct perpetrator” is understood
here not as the sole “real” perpetrator, but just as the physical
or immediate perpetrator. References to senior leaders as
“indirect” perpetrators—understood as mediate perpetrators—
do not undermine their level of responsibility as principals at all.
This is connected to the scope of “the crime scene” in cases of
international crimes such as concentration camps where senior
leaders are not usually present. This article precisely focuses on
those perpetrators and not on low level or middle-ranking
individuals.
B. Why a Suitable Mode of Liability when Prosecuting the “Big
Fish” Matters?
International crimes prosecuted at international and hybrid
criminal tribunals normally involve a large of number of
perpetrators who range from senior state or non-state leaders,
to low-echelon actors. Due to their dimension, those crimes are
usually committed collectively. Nonetheless, their criminal
repression has to be conducted on an individual basis in
accordance with the principle of individual rather than collective
liability and punishment, which is a basic principle of modern
criminal law, regardless of how many perpetrators are
23
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, ¶ 517 (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF; ICC Statute, supra note 13, art.
25(3)(b) (stating that a person who “[o]rders, solicits or induces the commission
of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted” will be held criminally
responsible and liable for punishment).
24 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶
518.

9
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involved.25 The determination of the theory or mode of liability
to be used constitutes one of the most important issues in trials
of the most senior political or military leader, such as presidents,
highest ranking military officers, and heads of non-state armed
groups.26 The attribution of criminal liability to senior leaders
is usually a difficult task due to evidentiary problems since these
individuals are geographically remote from the crime scene and
have no contact with the direct perpetrators. As a result,
criminal liability approaches developed for common offences are
not suitable. This explains why international criminal law and,
in particular, international and hybrid criminal tribunals have
been so concerned to flesh out notions such as JCE or “control
over the crime” to appropriately reflect the real dimension of the
criminality of senior leaders in conformity with basic criminal
law principles. Unfortunately, these objectives have not always
been fully met when applying JCE.
At international and hybrid criminal tribunals, the selection
and implementation of the most suitable legal theory also
matters due to immediate practical consequences. Since the
constitutive instruments and/or prosecutorial policies of
international and hybrid criminal tribunals are focused on
offenders regarded as the most responsible or senior leaders,27
25
Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations:
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of
International Criminal Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 93 (2005).
26
See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 105 (2d ed. 2004) (referencing courts’ difficulty in ascertaining
leaders’ guilt based on what may be circumstantial evidence when there may
be a standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
27
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, International Criminal Court,
Address at the Nuremberg Conference: “Building a Future on Peace and
Justice”, (June 24, 25, 2007); However, at the ICTY, the Prosecutor’s initial
strategy was “pyramidal,” i.e., the Prosecutor did first target lower level
suspects, and then gradually moved on to go for the “big fish” including
military commanders and senior political and military leaders. Only later, the
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence were amended so that the ICTY’s
indictments would concentrate on: “one or more of the most senior leaders
suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal.” ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 28(A). Although the
ICC Statute or Rules of Procedure and Evidence contain no similar provision,
according to Moreno-Ocampo’s Address at the Nuremberg Conference, 2007,
the ICC has focused on: “the worst perpetrators, responsible for the worst
crimes, those bearing the greatest responsibility, the organizers, the planners,
the commanders.”

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/1

10

2019

BRINGING THE BOSSES TO INT’L CRIM. TRIALS

11

their resources need to be used efficiently to meet their
mandates. The selection of the most appropriate legal theory
also matters in order to prevent that fairness, or perception of
fairness, of the trials is compromised. This is connected with the
full respect for the right of the accused to a fair trial and due
process guarantees, as well as coherence with basic principles of
criminal law as contained in the legal instruments of
international and hybrid criminal tribunals.28
Ultimately, the use of a legal theory that distorts the role
played by senior leaders may lead to a record that does not
accurately capture why and how serious international crimes
were committed. Prosecutions and trials are arguably the most
effective manners to separate collective guilt from individual
guilt and contribute to the removal of the stigma of misdeeds
from the innocent members of communities collectively blamed
for crimes committed on other communities.29 Prosecutions and
trials may also contribute to the truth and acknowledgment in
fragile post-conflict societies.30 Although the judicial approach
is not infallible, the judicial truth established as a result of a fair
trial has a “tested” quality that makes it persuasive.31
Therefore, the impact of selecting the most suitable mode of
28 ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 21; ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art.
20; Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, art. 17
[hereinafter SCSL]; Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the
Period of Democratic Kampuchea, NS/RKM/1004/006, Oct. 27, 2004, c. 10, arts.
33–35,
37,
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legaldocuments/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf; see ICC Statute,
supra note 13, arts. 64, 66–67 (discussing the rights of the accused).
29 Lawrence Weschler, Inventing Peace, NEW YORKER, Nov. 20, 1995, at
64 (quoting Richard Goldstone, “[s]pecific individuals bear the major share of
the responsibility, and it is they, not the group as a whole, who need to be held
to account . . . so that the next time around no one will be able to claim that all
Serbs did this, or all Croats or all Hutus . . . .”); Kenneth Roth, Introduction, in
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 15 (1995) (discussing how prosecutions
lead to individuals taking responsibility for their perpetuation of violence so
that their misconduct is not attributed to their people as a whole); see generally
Juan Mendez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 255, 277 (1997)
(exploring arguments for prosecutions as an effective tool for isolating
individual guilt from collective guilt).
30 See Mendez, supra note 29, at 278 (discussing advantages of trials in
ascertaining truth, asserting that trial verdicts are more difficult to challenge
and that the truth is more persuasive because it is “tested”).
31 Id.
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liability goes beyond the legitimacy of international criminal law
and international/hybrid criminal courts. A factor influencing
the findings of (international) criminal courts is the legal theory
of criminal liability used. Thus, the choice of one legal theory
over another may have an impact, at least indirectly, both on the
prevention of recurrence of the worst international crimes (often
masterminded by top leaders), and on the perception of fairness
of the trials of the most responsible.
C. JCE in a (Fading) Spotlight
Since the ICTY Appeals Chamber presided by Judge
Shahabuddeen (Guyana) and integrated by Judges Cassese
(Italy), Tieya (China), Nieto-Navia (Colombia), and Mwachande
Mumba (Zambia) defined JCE in Tadic in 1999,32 both the ICTY
and other international and hybrid criminal tribunals have used
JCE, especially concerning cases of leaders.
The ICTY
Prosecutor and Chambers thus relied on JCE in the
determination of individual criminal responsibility in inter alia
cases of Bosnian-Serb and Serb political leaders and highranking military officers, including the case against former
Serbian President Slobodan Milošević.33 ICTR cases involved
political and military Hutu leaders.34 The Prosecutors and
Chambers of the SCSL and the ECCC have also applied JCE to
cases including Liberia’s former president Charles Taylor35 and
senior Khmer Rouge leaders.36 Although the Iraqi High
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 178–234 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
15,
1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf.
33
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Amended
Indictment, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 28, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/040727.pdf.
34 Id.
35
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Decision on Urgent Defence Motion
Regarding a Fatal Defect in the Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment
Relating to the Pleading of JCE, Case No. SCSL-03-1-T, ¶ 76 (Special Court
for Sierra Leone, Feb. 27, 2009) (finding that the prosecution “adequately
fulfilled the pleading requirements of the alleged Joint Criminal Enterprise in
the Indictment”).
36 See, e.g., Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon, Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC,
Case
002/01
Judgment,
¶¶
690–96
(Aug.
7,
2014),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/2014-0807%2017%3A04/E313_Trial%20Chamber%20Judgement%20Case%20002_01
_ENG.pdf (finding JCE I and JCE II applicable).
32
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Tribunal was not strictly a hybrid criminal tribunal, it used JCE
in the trial of Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders.37
Conspiracy was once called by the American Judge Learned
Hand, the “darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery.”38
Similarly, the JCE has been regarded as the “darling notion” by
the Prosecution and, to a large extent, by the chambers of
international and hybrid criminal tribunals.39 JCE occupied a
central role as the most used mode of liability in the prosecution
of high-ranking perpetrators at international and hybrid
criminal tribunals. This adoption of JCE should not in principle
come as a surprise. JCE presents important qualities to
determine individual responsibility in mass criminality
contexts. Therefore, JCE links crimes to several offenders,
namely principals and accessories, connecting them with
distinct crimes. This enables the understanding of the dynamics
of interaction and cooperation in a criminal group or
organization, which is ever-present in the commission of
international crimes.40
Nonetheless, JCE was defined in Prosecutor v. Tadic, which
was a mob violence case involving low-level perpetrators who
established a small criminal enterprise. The accused, Dusko
Tadic, joined the group whose intention was to evict Bosnian
Muslims from their houses, but he had not personally inflicted
fatal blows.41 In this case, JCE was used to sustain Tadic’s
See Ian M. Ralby, Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability in the Iraqi High
Tribunal, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 281, 311, 313 (2010) (holding that the Iraq High
Tribunal was modeled after the ICC and utilized JCE).
38 Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925). But cf. Philip
E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1140
(1973) (noting that sometimes the use of conspiracy law can be a detriment to
the prosecution because the “use of a conspiracy charge converts a relatively
simple case into a monstrosity of conceptual complexity, giving the defense
substantial grounds for an appeal.”).
39 Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility Under
the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Responsibility, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 109, 110
(2007) (holding that JCE is relied on by international tribunals and by the
Prosecution).
40
Harmen van der Wilt, Joint Criminal Enterprise: Possibilities and
Limitations, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 91, 92 (2007).
41 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgement, ¶ 373
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf (finding that
37
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conviction for the killings. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic
concluded that the responsibility for crimes ensuing from group
criminality would attach to all of the members of the group who
shared the common purpose of the group to commit those crimes
and actively further the group’s aims in some way. 42
However, when the ICTY from 2000 onwards43 decided to
refocus its mandate from covering a wide range of perpetrators
to only prosecuting those perpetrators considered as the most
responsible, difficulties and challenges emerged.
The
application of JCE to cases concerning senior political and
military leaders in large criminal organizations faced two
important obstacles. First, JCE offered no consistent criterion
to distinguish between principals and accessories in large
criminal enterprises. This lack of consistent criterion, by
definition, is detrimental to the mandates of international and
hybrid criminal tribunals. It is detrimental because it is more
difficult to analyze the scope of individual guilt of senior
perpetrators understood in the collective dimension of
international crimes. Second, although the ICTY restricted the
scope of JCE trying to avoid the undesired presence of collective

the accused “was a member of the group of armed men that entered the village
of Jaski[c]i, searched it for men, seized them, beat them, and then departed
with them and that after their departure the five dead men named in the
Indictment were found lying in the village and that these acts were committed
in the context of an armed conflict. However, this Trial Chamber cannot, on
the evidence before it, be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
had any part in the killing of the five men or any of them.”).
42 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 196 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
15,
1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf (finding “[t]he
objective and subjective prerequisites for imputing criminal responsibility to a
participant who did not, or cannot be proven to have, effected the killing are as
follows: (i) the accused must voluntarily participate in one aspect of the
common design (for instance, by inflicting non-fatal violence upon the victim,
or by providing material assistance to or facilitating the activities of his coperpetrators); and (ii) the accused, even if not personally affecting the killing,
must nevertheless intend this result.”).
43 See S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 5 (Mar. 26, 2004) (directing tribunals to focus on
senior leaders when considering indictments under U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1503); see S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 1 (Aug. 28, 2003) (“Urging the ICTR to
formalize a detailed strategy, modelled on the ICTY Completion Strategy, to
transfer cases involving intermediate-and lower-rank accused to competent
national jurisdictions . . . . “) (alteration in original).
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responsibility,44 the case law of the ICTY shows that this
restriction was insufficient.45 Moreover, due to the vague
contours of a subjective approach, which is quintessential to
JCE, the SCSL and the Iraqi High Tribunal applied JCE in such
a broad manner that even supporters of JCE had misgivings. 46
Therefore, international and hybrid criminal courts should
reconsider the use of JCE as the primary mode of criminal
liability to prosecute high-level offenders. The ICC Chambers
have rejected JCE and replaced it with the “control over the
crime” approach in the cases of state and non-state senior
political and military actors, including Sudan’s President Omar
Al Bashir.47
II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRINCIPALS AND ACCESSORIES IN
COLLECTIVE CRIMINALITY

The first subsection of this section aims to demonstrate that
JCE contains a root problem: JCE provides an inconsistent
approach to the distinction between principals and accessories
to crimes when collective criminality is present, which is almost
always present in international crimes.
Therefore, the
qualification of senior leaders as principals may become blurred
under JCE. The second half of this section seeks to show that
44 See Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 344–
55 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tjug/en/brd-tj040901e.pdf (analyzing the
facts of the case, the court reasoned that “JCE is not an appropriate mode of
liability to describe the individual criminal responsibility of the Accused, given
the extraordinarily broad nature of this case, where the Prosecution seeks to
include within a JCE a person as structurally remote from the commission of
the crimes charged in the Indictment as the Accused.”).
45 See infra Section III.A (criticizing the restriction as being insufficient
to eliminating collective responsibility and treating all Accused individuals the
same).
46 See Ralby, supra note 38, at 329–30 (criticizing the broad usage of JCE
as a misapplication of the tests required for JCE); see generally Wayne Jordash
& Penelope Van Tuyl, Failure to Carry the Burden of Proof: How Joint
Criminal Enterprise Lost its Way at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 8 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 591, 593 (2010) (criticizing broad usage of JCE as
overreaching).
47 Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶¶ 7–8 (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01514.PDF (ordering Al Bashir arrested for
crimes under the theory of control over crime).
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the “control over the crime” approach is a better alternative since
it leads to a consistent and clear identification of senior leaders
as principals.
A. Problems in Clearly Differentiating Principals from
Accessories when Applying JCE
According to Fletcher “[t]he central question in any system
of complicity is distinguishing between co-perpetrators and
accessories. The former are punished as full perpetrators,
regardless of the liability of anyone else.”48 Thus, to accurately
establish the exact criminal liability of senior leaders, a sine qua
non question, is to determine what approach to distinguish
between principals and accessories to the crime is more suitable.
There are three possible approaches as identified by ICC PreTrial Chamber I in Prosecutor v. Lubanga and ICC Trial
Chamber II in Prosecutor v. Katanga.49
First, under an objective approach to distinguish between
principals and accessories, solely those who physically carry out
the elements of a crime can be considered principals.50 This
approach has not been used by international and hybrid criminal
tribunals in high-profile cases because senior leaders are almost
always remote from the crime scene. Applying this approach
would result in foot soldiers as the only principals whilst
political and military leaders would be held as mere accessories
to the crimes. This would be a paradox considering the much
more important role of the latter.
The second approach is subjective because it considers the
“state of mind in which the contribution to the crime was
made”51 to differentiate principals from accessories to the crime.
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 659 (2d. ed. 2002).
Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment pursuant to Article
74 of the Statute, ¶¶ 1390–94 (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04025.PDF; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/0401/06, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶¶ 328–30 (Mar. 14,
2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF.
50
Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the
Statute, ¶ 1391.
51
Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the
Statute, ¶ 921.
48

49

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/1

16

2019

BRINGING THE BOSSES TO INT’L CRIM. TRIALS

17

Therefore, it does not consider the level of contribution to the
commission of a crime. Under this approach, principals are only
those who “make their contribution to the crime with the shared
intent to commit the offence . . . regardless of the level of their
contribution to its commission.”52 JCE is grounded in this
approach. As remarked by the ICTY, the situation of an
individual as a principal to a crime lies in the shared intent by
all the participants in the enterprise to make their contributions
with the aim of furthering the common criminal purpose.53 The
level of contribution of JCE participants is thus secondary. 54
By fleshing out this subjective approach, the ICTY in
Prosecutor v. Tadic identified three variants of JCE. The first
category (JCE-I) corresponds to cases where all the co-accused
act in pursuance of a common design and possess the same
criminal intention.55 The second category (JCE-II) relates to the
so-called “concentration camp” cases. This category is similar to
the first one, but it is applied to cases where the alleged offences
have been committed by members of military or administrative
units.56 In these two categories, the defendant must actually
have the intent to commit the crime.57 The third category (JCEIII) is also referred to as the “extended form” of JCE.58 JCE-III
shares the same objective elements (actus reus) of the other two
varieties of JCE: i) the presence of a plurality of persons; ii) the
Id.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 228 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
15,
1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Milutinović, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion
Challenging Jurisdiction–Joint Criminal Enterprise, ¶ 20 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
May
21,
2003),
https://cld.irmct.org/assets/Uploads/full-text-dec/2003/03-0521%20Milutinovic%20et%20al%20Decision%20on%20Ojdanic%20JCE%20Jx
n%20Challenge.pdf.
54 Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 227, 229.
55 Id. ¶196.
56 Id. ¶ 202.
57 See id. ¶ 228 (discussing JCE-II, the accused’s personal knowledge of
the system of ill-treatment must be additionally proved).
58 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN I NTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS:
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 310 (2006) (noting the
difference that first two categories focus on intent, but the third category
describes an objective standard relating to the foreseeability of the
consequences of the action).
52
53
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existence of a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to
or involves the commission of a crime under the statute of the
respective tribunal; and iii) the participation of the accused in
the common design involving the perpetration of one or more
crimes under the jurisdiction of the tribunal.59
However, JCE-III differs from the other two types of JCE.
It is different because, in addition to crime(s) agreed upon in the
common plan, other crimes under JCE-III may be attributed if
“(i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by
one or other members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly
took that risk.”60 This foreseeability element, especially as to
specific intent crimes, has made JCE-III highly controversial. 61
Via JCE-III, the ICTY indeed adopted mutatis mutandis, the socalled Pinkerton doctrine from American conspiracy law.62 In
Pinkerton v. United States, the US Supreme Court ratified the
principle that co-conspirators are essentially accomplices to any
crime actually committed by other persons involved in the
conspiracy in furtherance of the common purpose of the
agreement.63 However, Justice Jackson strongly objected the
Pinkerton doctrine in Krulewitch v. United States at the US
Supreme Court.64 The full application of the Pinkerton doctrine
has been criticized as an “overly expansive application of
liability”65 and the drafters of the US Model Penal Code have
rejected it.66
Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 227.
Id. ¶ 228 (alteration in original).
61
See infra Section III.A (explaining the difficulties of prosecuting
“foreseeable” crimes).
62 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S 640, 646–48 (1946).
63 Id. at 645–47.
64 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445–51 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (stating that “a conviction of a substantive crime where there was
no proof of participation in or knowledge of it, upon the novel and dubious
theory that conspiracy is equivalent in law to aiding and abetting.”).
65 BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 868 (Robert C. Clark et al., 2d ed. 2010).
66 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1985) (noting that “law would lose all
sense of just proportion if simply because of the conspiracy itself each [coconspirator] were accountable for thousands of additional offenses of which he
was completely unaware and which he did not influence at all.”); see also id.
(stating that individuals may be held liable for all crimes that are a natural
and foreseeable consequence of acting according to the common purpose, but
natural and foreseeable is difficult to define).
59
60
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There is some overlap between conspiracy and JCE. The
Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
(IMT) extended conspiracy generally to all crimes under the
jurisdiction of this Tribunal,67 besides its inclusion in Article 6(a)
(conspiracy to commit crimes against peace). However, the IMT
only accepted conspiracy to commit crimes against peace as
discussed later.68 The Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR only
included conspiracy to commit genocide,69 following verbatim,
the 1948 Genocide Convention (Article 3(b)). Conspiracy was not
included in the ICC Statute due to the insistence of civil law
lawyers since conspiracy is generally not included in their
criminal codes.70 However, liability for “contributing to a
common purpose” (Article 25(3)(d)) was adopted as a surrogate
for conspiracy.71 JCE may be considered another name for
conspiracy due to their similarities.72 Nevertheless, JCE is a
mode of liability to commit crimes, but it is not a crime in itself.
This is different than conspiracy under common law as the US

67 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, art. 6 Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
280 [hereinafter Prosecution and Punishment] (stating that “[l]eaders,
organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes
[crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity] are
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.”).
68
See infra Section III.A (discussing whether the application of the
doctrine of JCE can be extrapolated from small criminal enterprises to larger
ones).
69
See ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 4(3)(b) (discussing what
constitutes a punishable act); see ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 2(3)(b)
(discussing what constitutes a punishable act).
70
See Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE ISSUES,
NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 189, 198–99 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (discussing the
legislative history of general principles of criminal law in Part 3 of the Rome
Statute and Article 21 on Applicable Law).
71 WERLE, supra note 8, at 167; see Eser, supra note 8, at 802 (discussing
the history of “conspiracy” and how the definition of the conspiracy has
changed over time); see generally Ambos, supra note 8, at 760, 761 (discussing
facilitation and contribution).
72 See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations:
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of
International Criminal Law 93 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 119 (2005) (discussing the
formal distinction between JCE and conspiracy, and the weight such a
distinction carries).
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Supreme Court importantly identified in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.73
However, conspiracy is a mode of criminal responsibility under
the US Model Penal Code.74
Furthermore, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v.
Milutinović, which was integrated by a majority of common law
judges,75 identified a difference between conspiracy and JCE:
“while mere agreement is sufficient in the case of conspiracy, the
liability of a member of a joint criminal enterprise will depend
on the commission of criminal acts in furtherance of that
enterprise.”76
Even though under JCE senior leaders can be principals to
the crime regardless of their remoteness from the crime scene,
such as concentration camps, JCE distinguishes between
principals and accessories to the crimes based exclusively on the
will of the defendant. In other words, minor contributions that
may eventually include preparation of the actual commission of
the crimes may be sufficient provided that the common criminal
purpose is shared.77 Conversely, major contributions with
knowledge of the common criminal purpose, but without
necessarily sharing it, do not trigger criminal liability as a
principal under JCE. This was explicitly acknowledged by the
ICTY as JCE provides with no formal distinction between JCE
members “who make overwhelmingly large contributions and
73 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 n.40 (2006) (noting that “[the
ICTY] has adopted a ‘joint criminal enterprise’ theory of liability, but that is a
species of liability for the substantive offence . . . not a crime on its own.”).
74 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (1985) (describing inchoate
crimes, including the definition of conspiracy); see also VAN SCHAACK & SLYE,
supra note 65, at 866 (noting that “[t]he Model Penal Code treats conspiracy
as a form of responsibility at § 5.03(1)”).
75
Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on
Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction–Joint Criminal
Enterprise, ¶ 25 (Int’l Crim. Trib. of the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 2003),
https://cld.irmct.org/assets/Uploads/full-text-dec/2003/03-0521%20Milutinovic%20et%20al%20Decision%20on%20Ojdanic%20JCE%20Jx
n%20Challenge.pdf (Presiding by Judge Shahabudeen (Guyana) and
integrated by Judges Hunt (Australia), Gunawardana (Pakistan), Pocar
(Italy), and Jorda (France)).
76 Id. ¶ 23.
77 Katrina Gustafson, The Requirements of an ‘Express Agreement’ for
Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability: A Critique of Brdjanin, 5 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 134, 141 (2007).
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JCE members whose contributions, though significant, are not
as great.”78
The above-analyzed point reveals a fundamental problem
affecting JCE: its imposition of equal culpability to all members
of the same JCE. Whilst some ICTY judgments tried to
incorporate the role and function of the accused in the criminal
enterprise,79 the predominant tendency was to regard all
participants as equals in regards to criminal liability
attribution.80 This may even be associated to a unitary concept
of perpetration, namely, no distinction between principals and
accessories, which is still present in few domestic systems.81 The
absence of a distinction between principals and accessories in
the Charters of the IMT and the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East82 was due to the fact that these tribunals by
definition truly focused only on the most responsible senior
offenders.83 However, the distinction between principals and
78 Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 432 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
of
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Apr.
3,
2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/acjug/en/brd-aj070403-e.pdf (noting that
the Court does not differentiate based on the degree of contribution to the
purpose of the crime).
79 See Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 306,
309–10, 312 (Int’l Crim. Trib. of the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/tjug/en/kvo-tj011002e.pdf (stating that to
be held liable as a participant in a JCE, the extent of the participation must be
“significant”); see Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgement, ¶¶
97, 104 (Int’l Crim. Trib. of the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/acjug/en/kvo-aj050228e.pdf (overruling the
Trial Chamber’s consideration about an additional requirement of
significant/substantial contribution of a JCE participant and added that this
may only be relevant to prove the mens rea of shared intent).
80 See Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgement, ¶ 111
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/vasiljevic/acjug/en/val-aj040225e.pdf
(providing
that participation in a JCE is regarded as a form of commission and all
participants of the joint enterprise to be equally guilty regardless of the role
they played).
81
See Straffelov. Lov 126 of April 15, 1930. Consolidated text in
Lovbekendtgorelse 1156 of Sept 20, 2018, Codice Penale art. 110 (It.).
82
See Eser, supra note 8, at 784 (stating that the tribunal does not
distinguish between principals and accessories).
83
International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter, art. 1, Jan.
19, 1946 (stating “[t]he International Military Tribunal for the Far East is
hereby established for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major
war criminals in the Far East.”); see Prosecution and Punishment, supra note
687, art. 1 (stating that “there shall be established an International Military
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accessories has at the international level existed since Control
Council Law No. 10,84 which was adopted by the Allied Control
Council in Germany for the punishment of persons—other than
the accused at the IMT—guilty of international crimes.85
The special nature of international crimes leads to the need
to distinguish between principals and accessories in order to
identify the most responsible and to determine how and why
they unleashed large scale violence. Certain wording used by
the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic caused some uncertainty
concerning interpretation of JCE as a theory originating
principal liability in conformity with customary international
law.86 This corresponded to the fact that the ICTY, by
interpreting the heading “committed” in Article 7(1) of its
Statute (which is equivalent to Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute),
concluded that:
[I]t does not exclude those modes of participating in the
commission of crimes which occur where several persons having a
common purpose embark on criminal activity that is then carried
out either jointly or by some members of this plurality of
persons . . . . The notion of common design as a form of accomplice
liability is firmly established in customary international law and
in addition is upheld, albeit implicitly [in the ICTY Statute]. 87

The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Milutinović in
May 2003, clarified that JCE or the common purpose doctrine
constitutes a theory of co-perpetration that gives rise to principal
Tribunal . . . for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war
criminals of the European Axis.”).
84 Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace
and Against Humanity, Control Council Law No. 10, art. II(2) (stating that
“[a]ny person . . . is deemed to have committed a crime . . . if he was (a)
principal or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime . . . .”).
85
See id. (discussing the enactment of this statute in Germany as a
means “to give effect to the terms of the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943
and the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 . . . .”).
86 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 192–96 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
15,
1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf.
87 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 190, 220 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
15,
1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf.
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liability (as opposed to accessorial liability), and thus falls under
the heading “committed” in Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. 88
However, judgments of the ICTY Trial Chambers from 1999 to
2003 were quite erratic. Some judgments explicitly qualified
JCE as a theory of accomplice liability, affirming that the
distinction between principals and accessories was alien to the
ICTY Statute.89 This may relate to the standard common law
logics of principals and agents.90 Other judgments considered
JCE as accessorial liability together with the notion of aiding
and abetting,91 and as a form of accomplice liability not covered
by the expression “committed” in Article 7(1) of the ICTY
Statute.92 Finally, other judgments of ICTY Trial Chambers
were imprecise by determining that participants in a JCE can
be either principals to a crime (co-perpetrators) or accessories to
the crime (aiders or abettors) depending on their level of
contribution,93 or the state of mind with which they contributed
88
Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on
Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction–Joint Criminal
Enterprise, ¶¶ 20, 31 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 21,
2003),
https://cld.irmct.org/assets/Uploads/full-text-dec/2003/03-0521%20Milutinovic%20et%20al%20Decision%20on%20Ojdanic%20JCE%20Jx
n%20Challenge.pdf.
89 See Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 74–77
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krnojelac/tjug/en/krn-tj020315e.pdf (stating that
the distinction between a “participant” and the “principal offender” is
unnecessary and irrelevant for sentencing purposes).
90
See BOYCE ET. AL., supra note 9, at 494–95, 505, 519–21 (outlining
common law and Model Penal Code theories of liability); see LAFAVE, supra
note 9, at 664 (discussing the differences between principals and
accomplices/accessories); see also supra Section I.A (defining a “direct
perpetrator”).
91
See Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement, ¶ 399
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordic_cerkez/tjug/en/kor-tj010226e.pdf
(comparing “the forms of responsibility based on participation in a common
purpose with aiding and abetting . . . .”).
92 See Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36, Decision on Motion by
Momir Talic for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 40–45 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia
Mar.
28,
2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/10328PR215226.htm (recognizing
“common design” or “common purpose” as a “form of accomplice liability” that
doesn’t align with the definition of ‘committed’ which is proposed to
comprehend “physical perpetration of a crime by the offender himself . . . .”).
93 See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 642–43
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf (denoting that
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to the crime.94 Moreover, the ICTY recognized that the
introduction of a criterion of “special contribution” may lead to
some disparities.95 The background problem is that no formal
distinction exists between JCE members who make
overwhelmingly large contributions to the criminal enterprise,
and those whose contributions are less significant.96
This uncertainty may also affect the accused. The accused
is already aware of the mode of liability charged with. However,
the accused might be adversely affected with a surprising
sentence that arises out of this uncertainty if he/she is switched
from an accessory in the charges to a principal in the conviction.
Although JCE was not explicitly included in the Statutes of the
ICTY and the ICTR, the status of JCE as part of customary
international law—which is a legal source applied by these
tribunals—holds importance relating to the principle of
legality.97 Such principle goes to the heart of the defendant’s
rights since it includes the nullum crime sine lege principle and
the prohibition of non-retroactivity.98
Accordingly, some
scholars cast doubts on how consistent JCE, as applied by the
“accomplice liability” is an ancillary form of participation compared to “direct
or principal perpetrators”).
94 See Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 249,
273 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/tjug/en/kvo-tj011002e.pdf (concluding that
actors making contributions knowing but not sharing the common criminal
purpose are accessories).
95
See Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 432
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/acjug/en/brd-aj070403-e.pdf (holding that
“[t]he Appeals Chamber recognizes that, in practice, this approach may lead to
some disparities, in that it offers no formal distinction between JCE members
who make overwhelmingly large contributions and JCE members whose
contributions, though significant, are not as great.”).
96 See id. (holding that there are disparities because “any [disparities are]
adequately dealt with at the sentencing stage.”).
97 See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant
to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), ¶ 34, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (stating “[i]n the view of the Secretary General, the
application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires that the
international tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law
that are beyond any doubt part of customary law . . . .”) (alteration in original).
98 CASSESE, supra note 2, at 30–52 (holding that the nullum crime sine
lege principal and the prohibition against nonretroactivity are important parts
of international criminal law).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/1

24

2019

BRINGING THE BOSSES TO INT’L CRIM. TRIALS

25

ICTY and the ICTR, is with the principle of legality.99 Despite
these doubts, the ICTY considered that the question of JCE as
part of customary international law and, in accordance with the
principle of legality, had already been settled.100
Therefore, JCE presents some important problems in
clearly identifying senior leaders as principals to the crime to
ensure they do not dilute or trivialize their liability. Some
scholars recognize this limitation and criticize JCE for that
problem.101 However, they agree with some jurisprudence102
that, as far as the difference between principals and accessories
is introduced during sentencing via attenuating or aggravating
circumstances, concerns as to the problem should not be
excessive.103
The problems associated with identifying senior leaders as
principals to the crime to ensure they do not escape liability is
criticized. First, although judges may partially distinguish
minor contributors (accessories) from principals at sentencing
via mitigating and aggravating factors, criminal responsibility
is not simply a function of sentencing. This difference has to be
reflected not only during the sentencing, but also in the
indictment and trial, which holds importance for the legitimacy
of international and hybrid criminal tribunals. Individual
criminal responsibility is not exclusively subsumed by serving
an appropriate time in prison, but instead, it reaches the core of
the criminal offence and leads to the stigma of having been
See, e.g., OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 52 (finding that “this conclusion is
not necessarily consistent with those general principles on criminal
responsibility laid down both in the ICTYS and in general international
criminal law.”).
100 Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 431 (explaining that JCE
is customary international law); see Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A,
Judgement, ¶ 62 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/acjug/en/sta-aj060322e.pdf (finding that
JCE is customary international law).
101 Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility,
5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 159, 167–72 (2007).
102 See Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 432 (recognizing that
although JCE leads to disparities between those accused who had a large
impact and those that had a small impact, these disparities are “adequately
dealt with at the sentencing stage.”).
103 Ambos, supra note 101, at 173.
99

25

26

PACE INT’L L. REV.

Vol. 32:1

convicted as a principal. The determination of the guilt of the
accused is therefore a “central truth that the current version of
joint criminal enterprise obscures.”104 Second, not all parts of a
criminal organization are equal regardless of the difficulties to
scrutinize its internal deliberative structure. Leaders, mid-level
perpetrators, and executioners perform different functions at
different levels in the commission of international crimes.
Hence, the attribution of equal criminal responsibility to
offenders who did not have the same role is unacceptable due not
only to legal, but moral considerations.105
The problems with the application of JCE become clearer in
the ICTY’s findings on the difference between JCE in cases of coperpetration (principals) and aiding and abetting (accessories).
The ICTY repeatedly concluded that the support of the aider and
abettor has to have “a substantial effect upon the perpetration
of the crime. By contrast, it is sufficient for a participant in a
joint criminal enterprise to perform acts that in some way are
directed to the furtherance of the common design.”106 The
paradox here is that the level of contribution required for aiding
and abetting (accessorial liability) is higher than for
participating in a JCE (principal liability as a co-perpetrator).
Such a distinction may be understood as JCE is grounded in a
subjective approach to distinguish between principals and
accessories and, hence, the distinction is based on the state of
104
Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of
Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 69, 88 (2007) (discussing
relative culpability of minor participants).
105 See id. at 86–88 (discussing the problem of equal culpability).
106 Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgement, ¶ 102 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
25,
2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/vasiljevic/acjug/en/val-aj040225e.pdf;
see
also
Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub
Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction–Joint Criminal Enterprise, ¶ 20
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 2003),
https://cld.irmct.org/assets/Uploads/full-text-dec/2003/03-0521%20Milutinovic%20et%20al%20Decision%20on%20Ojdanic%20JCE%20Jx
n%20Challenge.pdf (explaining that merely knowing about a JCE is not
enough to be regarded as an aider and abettor); see also Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 655, 662, 674, 694 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Mar.
17,
2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/acjug/en/090317.pdf (discussing the actus
reus and its requirements, such as assisting, encouraging, and lending moral
support).
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mind under which the contribution to the crime was made.
Accordingly, the lower level of contribution required by coperpetration founded in JCE is “compensated” by a higher
threshold subjective element while only “knowledge” is required
in aiding and abetting.107 Co-perpetration based on JCE requires
aiming at the achievement of the common criminal plan or
purpose, namely, dolus directus in the first degree.108 The
unintended but improper consequence of the application of JCE
is that central players in the commission of offences may be
qualified simply as accessories and, in turn, those who have a
minor role—such as foot soldiers—can be found guilty as the sole
principals. A related problem is that the ICTY rejected the
possibility of finding an accused guilty because of aiding and
abetting a JCE; although, in theory, this is feasible as an aider
or abettor to a single crime within a JCE still holds such status
unless that crime is totally unrelated to that JCE. 109
In any event, the combination of a stringent subjective
element with a low level of contribution does not exist in JCEIII because the ICTY ruled that criminal responsibility for a
crime may be imposed on an actor even if “he only knew that the
perpetration of such a crime was merely a possible
107 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 229(iv) (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
15,
1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgement, ¶ 33(iv) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former
Yugoslavia
Sept.
17,
2003),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/0020702400207060.pdf.
108
Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10 and ICTR-96-17A, Judgement, ¶ 467 (Dec. 13, 2004); see OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 260
(discussing the JCE requirements of co-perpetration); see Prosecutor v.
Brđanin, In Trial Chamber II, Decision on Motion by Momir Talic for
Provisional Release, ¶ 365 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar.
28, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/10328PR215226.htm
(discussing the foreseeability of a crime in the first degree).
109 Ambos, supra note 101, at 169–70; see Prosecutor v. Kvočka Case No.
IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 273 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Feb. 28, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/acjug/en/kvo-aj050228e.pdf
(discussing the liability to be incurred by the presence of a participant in a joint
criminal enterprise); see generally DAVID ORMEROD & KARL LAIRD, SMITH AND
HOGAN’S TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 264–65 (11th ed. 2005)
(discussing the liability of an aider or abettor in relation to their efforts for the
JCE).
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consequence . . . .”110 This leads to another paradox whereby
JCE-III leads to principal liability as opposed to aiding and
abetting even though the objective and subjective elements of
aiding and abetting are more demanding. The ICTY Appeals
Chamber tried to justify this by saying that in a JCE-III “the
actor already possesses the intent to participate and further the
common criminal purpose of a group.”111 Such explanation is
unsatisfactory. A person cannot be found responsible as a
principal unless he/she holds the mens rea required by the
respective crime; should one fall short of meeting the subjective
elements of the crime contained in the respective crime
definition, then he/she can eventually be considered as an
accessory.112 Thus, JCE-III may, at least, and to an important
extent, amount to a form of aiding and abetting despite the case
law of the ICTY and the ICTR considered it as raising principal
liability.113
Overall, the identification of senior leaders as principals
under JCE is problematic. On the one hand, the ICTY
sometimes considered JCE participants as mere accessories to
the crimes; while on the other hand, JCE as a subjective
approach may lead to finding a central player who substantially
contributes to a crime as an accessory.
B. The “Control over the Crime” Approach as an Alternative
The “control over the crime” approach to distinguish
principals and accessories was applied in Prosecutor v. Stakić by
an ICTY Trial Chamber,114 which was constituted by civil law
110
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgement, ¶ 33 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
29,
2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acjug/en/bla-aj040729e.pdf.
111 Id.
112
See Ambos, supra note 101, at 168–71 (describing the elements
required to be considered an aider and abettor, a co-perpetrator, or an
accessory).
113 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 192, 229
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf (explaining the
differences between acting toward a common purpose and aiding and abetting);
see also Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10 and ICTR-96-17-A, Judgement,
¶¶ 462–67 (noting the mens rea and extreme result of expanding the liability).
114
Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, ¶ 440 (Int’l
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judges.115 However, the trial judgment was overruled by the
ICTY Appeals Chamber, constituted by both civil law and
common law Judges,116 which employed JCE instead.117
Nevertheless, the “control over the crime” approach has been
successfully applied at the ICC. ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, which
mainly consisted of civil law judges,118 considered in Prosecutor
v. Lubanga that:
[P]rincipals to a crime are not limited to those who physically carry
out the objective elements of the offence. Rather, principals also
include those individuals who, in spite of their absence from the
scene of the crime, control or mastermind its commission because
they decide whether and . . . how the offence will be committed. 119

The German scholar Claus Roxin developed the modern
guise of this approach, which is an open concept and presents
three main variants.120 First, the “control over the action” in
direct or immediate perpetration, is such that an individual or a
group of individuals physically commit(s) murder.121 This first
variant is illustrated by criminal codes of civil law countries,
such as Columbia.122 Under this first variant, the perpetrator is
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
31,
2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf.
115 See id. (presiding by Judge Schomburg (Germany), Judge Vassylenko
(Ukraine) and Judge Argibay (Argentina)).
116
See id. (presiding by Judge Pocar (Italy) and integrated by Judge
Shahabuddeen (Guyana), Judge Guney (Turkey), Judge Vaz (Senegal), and
Judge Meron (United States)).
117
Id. ¶¶ 59–63.
118
See generally Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Decision on the confirmation of charges (Jan. 29, 2007), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_02360.PDF (presiding by Judge Jorda (France)
and integrated by Judge Kuenyehia (Ghana) and Judge Steiner (Brazil)).
119
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment
pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 920 (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF.
120
CLAUS ROXIN, Autoria y Dominio del Hecho en Derecho Penal 149
(2000) § 17 [hereinafter Roxin 1]; see generally Claus Roxin, Crimes as Part of
Organized Power Structures, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 193, 193–205 (2011) (noting
that the concept of “perpetrator” is one that is more open-ended and varies
depending on specific facts) [hereinafter Roxin 2].
121
See generally Roxin 2, supra note 120, at 195–202 (discussing the
murder in the context of “control over the action” through the Stashynsky
case).
122 Criminal Code of (1988), Section 25(2); see generally CÓDIGO PENAL [C.
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a person who carries out the elements of the crime and has
control over the crime, insofar as he/she physically carries those
elements.123 This mode does not seem to be relevant for the
attribution of criminal liability to senior leaders since they
usually are neither the trigger-pullers, nor are they present at
the crime scene.
Second, the “control over the will” in indirect perpetration,
e.g., when an individual uses an innocent agent (a minor or an
insane) to commit murder, or when the physical (direct)
perpetrator is coerced or mistaken.124 Criminal courts of both
civil law and common law countries have applied this second
variant.125 Such a variant may be of practical importance when
the physical perpetrators are innocent agents, such as child
soldiers who have been used in several recent armed conflicts, 126
or when there is enough evidence that the physical perpetrators
were coerced.
Third, an example of “functional control over the will” in
indirect perpetration would be when a soldier who
himself/herself is a perpetrator (neither under coercion, mistake,
nor an innocent agent) commits murder by implementing orders
within an organized structure of power controlled by a senior
PEN.] [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 29, (Colom.) (discussing the differences between
those who perform the criminal conduct and those who contribute to the
criminal conduct).
123
See Roxin 1, supra note 120, § 18 (discussing that the person who
performs the necessary elements of a crime is the author of the crime); see also
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, ¶ 332 (Jan. 29, 2007), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_02360.PDF (discussing when a person can
become a perpetrator of a crime); see also Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 488(a) (Sept. 30, 2008),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF (noting that “a
principal is one who . . . physically carries out all elements of the offence . . .
.”).
124 Roxin 1, supra note 120, at 259–69; Roxin 2, supra note 120, at 197.
125 See generally OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 61–62 nn.271, 273–76 & 279
(noting cases that have applied this approach). Courts of common-law
countries have also applied the notion of the “control over the crime” to convict,
as a perpetrator, the person who uses an innocent agent as a tool to commit a
crime.
126 Armed conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone,
Rwanda, Colombia and Peru.
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political or military leader, or a group of senior leaders (indirect
perpetrators or masterminds).127 Courts of civil law countries
have embraced this third variant in cases involving individuals
such as former Latin-American Presidents.128 This variant has
a broader scope of practical application than the second one. In
cases where there is one individual mastermind, who does not
physically commit a crime, the individual can still be found
liable for indirect commission because the individual uses a
“direct” perpetrator as an “instrument” who is functionally
controlled by the former’s dominant will.
The indirect
perpetrator’s control over the crime is thus derived from the
functional power of an individual’s dominant will.129 Where
there is a plurality of masterminds, the functional control is
based on the contribution of several offenders to the commission
of a crime, which amounts to co-performance. This is grounded
in the principle of distribution of tasks. The key position of each
co-perpetrator lies on their shared control over the crime, hence,
their power to ruin the implementation of the common plan by
withholding his/her contribution to the crime.130

127 See Roxin 1, supra note 120, at 269–80 (discussing actors different
involvements in criminal activity in organized power structures); see also
Roxin 2, supra note 120, at 197–202 (discussing control based on organized
power structures, the Eichmann case, and perpetration and participation with
organizational power structure).
128 See infra Section III.B (discussing specific cases involving “functional
control over the will”).
129 See Roxin 1, supra note 120, § 20 (discussing the possible justifications
for actors who did not execute the act alone); see also Prosecutor v. Lubanga,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 332(ii)
(Jan. 29, 2007), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_02360.PDF
(discussing that individuals control the will of those who carry out the objective
elements of the offence through both direct and indirect perpetration); see also
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation
of
charges,
¶
488(c)
(Sept.
30,
2008),
https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF (defining principal as a person who
“has control over the will of those who carry out the objective elements of the
offence . . . .”).
130 See Roxin 1, supra note 120, § 27 (discussing co-authorship and the
dominion of fact); see also Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, ¶ 332(iii) (explaining that principals have control over
the offense based on the essential tasks assigned to them); see also Katanga,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 488(b)
(providing a definition of a principal perpetrator which considers the level of
control the principal perpetrator had over the crime, measured by “the
essential tasks assigned to him . . . .”).
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Bearing in mind the previous doctrinal framework, it is
argued here that the “control over the crime” approach is a
sounder option than JCE to distinguish principals and
accessories.
Thus, it more accurately captures the real
dimensions of the criminal liability of political and military
leaders based on three arguments.
First, the “control over the crime” approach offers more
coherent parameters to clearly qualify the most senior leaders
as principals and not just as mere accessories to the crime. It is
argued here that the “control over the crime” is a more reliable
approach. Due to its hybrid nature, this approach merges the
best of the subjective and objective approaches leading to a
result legally and logically more consistent. On the other hand,
the objective component is given by the factual circumstances
leading to the control over the crime, and the subjective
component is represented by the awareness of the factual
circumstances that lead to such control.131 In the light of the
jurisprudence of the ICC, the “control over the crime” approach
reconciles two contrary positions and makes them move
forward.132
This clearly contrasts with JCE where, as
analyzed,133 minor defendants may be found as the only
principals and senior leaders may be convicted only as mere
accessories. Therefore, it can be argued that the “control over
the crime” approach is more realistic than JCE because the
former is better suited than the latter to reflect the dynamics of
grave criminality as it happens in the real world. In other words,
it is considered here that it is fair and logical to hold senior
leaders guilty as principals and not as mere accessories in cases
where they were aware of the crime that they intentionally
masterminded and kept under their control.

131
See OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 36 (analyzing the subjective and
objective components of the control of the crime theory).
132 See Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation
of charges, ¶ 484 (citing Claus Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil II § 25/30
(2003), noting that “the doctrine of control over the crime corresponds to an
evolution of subjective and objective approaches, such that it effectively
represents a synthesis of previously opposed views and doubtless owes its
broad acceptance to this reconciliation of contrary positions.”).
133 See supra Section II.A (discussing potential issues that occur when
differentiating principals from accessories).
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Second, the “control over the crime” approach is a clearer
standard to distinguish between principals and accessories.
This is illustrated by how the ICC Statute frames the modes of
liability. Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute deals with the three
basic modes of liability relating to commission by a principal “if
that person: (a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual,
jointly with another or through another person, regardless of
whether that other person is criminally responsible.” In turn,
modes of accessorial liability are listed in subsequent
paragraphs under the same article: ordering, soliciting and
inducing (Article 25(3)(b)); aiding, abetting and otherwise
assisting in the perpetration of the crime (Article 25(3)(c)); and
a residual form of accessory liability (Article 25(3)(d)),134 which
was cited by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic
to give content to its then novel JCE.135 Accordingly, unlike the
ICTY, which had to provide content to its Statute about how to
distinguish between principals and accessories, the ICC Statute
already contains a clear distinction between principals and
accessories to the crime. By relying on Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC
Statute, ICC Trial Chamber II in Prosecutor v. Katanga and ICC
Pre-Trial Chamber I in Prosecutor v. Lubanga concluded that
the ICC Statute does not embrace the objective approach as the
commission by another person cannot be reconciled with the
consideration of physical perpetrators as the only possible
principals to the crime.136
Third, the ICC, based on its Statute, has also concluded that
Article 25(3)(a) cannot be grounded in a subjective approach.137
134 See ICC Statute, supra note 13 art. 25(3)(d) (imposing responsibility
where the offender “[i]n any other way contributes to the commission or
attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a
common purpose.”).
135 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 222 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
15,
1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf.
136 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment pursuant
to Article 74 of the Statute ¶ 1392 (Trial Chamber II Mar. 7, 2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04025.PDF;
Prosecutor
v.
Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the confirmation of charges,
¶ 332(ii) (Pre-Trial Chamber I Jan. 29, 2007), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_02360.PDF.
137
See Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the confirmation of
charges, ¶¶ 333–37 (discussing individuals who have control over the
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The ICC found that Article 25(3)(d) incorporates a mode of
liability akin to JCE and, as under the ICC Statute this
provision raises accessorial liability,138 the approach endorsed by
the ICC Statute to identify the principals is not subjective unlike
that adopted by the ICTY and the ICTR.139 Therefore, the ICC
by interpreting its Statute has considered JCE or, in general,
modes of liability based on a subjective approach as residual or
accessorial. By considering JCE as a theory under customary
international law to distinguish principals from accessories, the
ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic cited Article
25(3)(d).140 However, as mentioned, ICC Pre-Trial Chambers in
Prosecutor v. Lubanga and Prosecutor v. Katanga rejected the
use of a subjective approach. Some authors, based on a critical
analysis of the ICTY’s jurisprudence, have casted doubts on both
how coherent the use of JCE was to distinguish between
principals and accessories and whether participation in a JCE
gives rise to liability as a principal to the crime in the first
place.141
In any event, the real scope of criminal liability of political
and military leaders is expected to be accurately and clearly
portrayed by limiting it to one or more of the three modes of
commission of the offence as well as the subjective criteria for distinguishing
between principals and accessories under Article 25(3)(a) and 25(3)(d) of the
ICC Statute); The ICC also added that Article 25(3)(d) would have been the
basis of the concept of co-perpetration under Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute,
had the drafters of the ICC Statute opted for a subjective approach to
distinguish between principals and accessories.
138
See id. ¶¶ 334–37 (discussing the close relation between Article
25(3)(d) and the concept of joint criminal liability).
139
See generally George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming
Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case, 3 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 539, 549 (2005) (illustrating that although Article 25(3)(d) was
considered akin to JCE by the ICC, there is actually an important difference
because in the former, either intention to aim the criminal plan or even
knowledge would suffice, whereas knowledge is not enough in JCE).
140 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 222–23
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf
(noting
that
Article 25 of the ICC Statute was not only adopted by a Diplomatic Conference
in Rome but was also adopted by a majority of States, and was endorsed by the
Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly).
141 See OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 53–54 (discussing incongruent notions
of international and regional conventions in differentiating principals and
accessories).
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principal criminal liability contained in the ICC Statute read in
the light of the “control over the crime” approach.142 Indeed, the
ICC has so far used those modes of liability concerning state and
non-state civilian and military leaders, including warlords of
Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan’s President
Al Bashir. As JCE is contained in the ICC Statute as a residual
mode of liability, it will likely be used exceptionally. The ICC
primarily applied the “control over the crime” approach rather
than JCE.143 Indeed, the ICC Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v.
Lubanga confirmed that the “control over the crime” theory is “a
convincing and adequate approach.”144 Among other legal
scholars, Ambos has also concluded that “this theory is indeed
now the guiding principle to distinguish between perpetration
and accessorial responsibility (secondary participation) in the
Court’s case law.”145
III. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY ISSUES
The first subsection of this section aims to demonstrate that
the application of JCE in cases of senior leaders may lead to
inconsistencies with the principle of individual criminal liability.
On the one hand, JCE presents limitations in large criminal
enterprises. While on the other hand, the attribution of crimes
not originally agreed on in a JCE but supposedly “foreseeable” is
highly controversial.
The second subsection seeks to
demonstrate that the “control over the crime” approach does not
present those problems. In particular, the mode of indirect
perpetration controlling an organized structure of power better
reflects the liability of senior leaders in strict respect for the
principle of individual criminal liability.

142
Briony McKenzie, The Principal Liability of Political and Military
Leaders for International Crimes: Joint Criminal Enterprise versus Indirect
Co-Perpetration 28–32 (Oct. 2014) (unpublished LLB (Hons) dissertation,
University of Otago) (on file with University of Otago).
143 See generally id. (discussing the application of the control over the
crime approach in the context of the ICC).
144 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5, Judgment on
the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanaga Dyilo against his conviction, ¶¶ 469–70,
473 (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_09844.PDF.
145 Ambos, supra note 8, at 979, 997–98.
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A. Difficult Application of JCE to Large Criminal Enterprises
and the Problem of “Foreseeable” Crimes
Individual responsibility issues, a first problem that the
original doctrine of JCE (as shaped by the ICTY in Prosecutor v.
Tadic), face issues in their application when determining
whether its application can be extrapolated from small criminal
enterprises to large ones. As mentioned, JCE was first framed
at the ICTY to address individual criminal liability out of a mob
violence case involving low-level perpetrators in pursuance of a
small criminal enterprise.146 However, the real challenge came
later when the ICTY started prosecuting and trying political and
military leaders for specific crimes committed by a multitude of
lower level offenders in a context of structural and geographical
remoteness between the former and the latter. The problem
then became clear as voiced by the former ICTY/ICTR
Prosecutor Del Ponte: “criminal liability of high ranking leaders
who share the intent to commit a crime and jointly act to achieve
it through various means, cannot be dependent on whether one
of them actually physically commits the crime.”147
In any event, the failure of JCE, as understood by the ICTY
and the ICTR to live up to that challenge, may be explained by
two complementary reasons.148 First, in systematic or large
scale criminality, the higher the position of a military or political
leader, the broader the criminal activities in which he/she has
participated in are.149 As a result, the number of members of a
JCE, in which the leader has supposedly been involved, often
becomes much higher.150 Second, the theory of JCE requires
including, within a JCE, political and military leaders as well as
mid-level and low-ranking followers who physically execute the
crimes.151 In scenarios characterized by large numbers of
146 See supra Section I.C (discussing specific courts that have applied the
joint criminal enterprise theory).
147 Carla Del Ponte, Investigation and Prosecution of Large-Scale Crimes
at the International Level: The Experience of the ICTY, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
539, 550–51 (2006).
148 See OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 189–90 (discussing difficulty in applying
traditional JCE notions to perpetrators who are remote).
149 Id. at 190.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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individuals and remoteness, the application of the original
notion of JCE becomes a sort of legal fiction that does not meet
real circumstances. JCE requires that all members of the
criminal enterprise act in pursuance of a single common
criminal plan. They additionally need to share both the intent
to commit the core crimes of the criminal enterprise and any
additional intent (dolus specialis) that may be required by such
crimes. For example, this contrasts with the situation of the
Nazi SS. Although the IMT, after a fair hearing declared the SS
to be a criminal organization, did not suggest that all of the SS
members shared the same common purpose of the SS.152
The common purpose doctrine assumes, as an element, that
JCE members in entering a prior agreement prove to be
psychologically capable and prepared to commit the crimes in
question and, therefore, prevents them from “recoil and . . . have
to blame themselves for their predicament.”153 The pivotal
importance of a prior and explicit agreement is grounded in its
condition as the only link that binds the members of the group
together. Nonetheless, in the contexts of large organizations
that contain several hierarchical layers, these explicit
agreements and mutual understandings are normally absent.
Because of these absent explicit agreements, the use of JCE in
charging high-ranking offenders is almost fatally compromised.
Several authors, including Antonio Cassese, have stood up for
JCE, concluding that the only solution in cases of vast criminal
enterprises to attribute criminal responsibility to senior political
and military leaders is simply not to rely on any JCE doctrine. 154
The application of JCE to large criminal enterprises seems
to come dangerously closer to a variety of collective criminal
liability155 and risks violating the principle of individual
152 IMT, Judgment of 1 October 1946, in 22 Trial of German Major War
Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at
Nuremberg, Germany 501–23 (1946) (declaring the Nazi Leadership Corps,
Gestapo and SD, and SS to be criminal organizations but not doing so as for
SA, Reich Cabinet, and the General Staff and High Command).
153 van der Wilt, supra note 40, at 107.
154 See Cassese, supra note 39, at 126, 133 (giving support to JCE).
155
See Mohamed Elewa Badar, “Just Convict Everyone!”–Joint
Perpetration: From Tadić to Stakić and Back Again, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 293,
302 (2006) (finding that “[i]f, one day, the Prosecution succeeds in granting a
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criminal responsibility.156
This theory is illustrated in
Prosecutor v. Brđanin when the prosecution alleged a broad JCE
spanning from the President of the Republika Srpska to
members of the Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) and Serb
paramilitary members.157
The ICTY Trial Chamber in
Prosecutor v. Brđanin, which was later overruled by the ICTY
Appeals Chamber on this point, had found that JCE should only
apply to relatively small-scale cases and not in this case due to
its extraordinarily broad nature.158 This example, to some
extent, is similar to the notion of considering membership in a
criminal organization as being a crime, something not seen since
the IMT Statute.159 Yet, when applying its Statute, the IMT
recommended that future trials for criminal membership should
conviction for one of the ‘specific purpose crimes’ under the third category of
joint criminal enterprise, this will alter the JCE doctrine to become an
umbrella to ‘just convict everyone’.”); see Ambos, supra note 101, at 167–69
(finding that JCE III makes a non-actor responsible for the conduct of an actor,
which is a form of vicarious liability, and should only be considered as an aider
or abettor to the crime).
156
See CASSESE, supra note 2, at 33–34 (stating that the principle of
individual criminal responsibility “lays down two notions. First, nobody may
be held accountable for criminal offences perpetrated by other persons . . . .
Secondly, a person may only be held criminally liable if he is somehow culpable
for any breach of criminal rules.”).
157 Alberto Nardelli et. al., Bosnia and Herzegovina: The World’s Most
Complicated System of Government?, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2014, 7:58 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/08/bosnia-herzegovinaelections-the-worlds-most-complicated-system-of-government (showing that
the Republika Srpska is one of two main political entities of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the other being the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina); see
generally Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, ¶ 10 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Sept.
1,
2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tjug/en/brd-tj040901e.pdf (discussing the
effects of the JCE on both the president and army members of the Republika
Srpska).
158
See Brđanin, IT-99-36-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 355–56 (finding that the
appeals chamber intended a small enterprise for JCE); see also Prosecutor v.
Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 422 (Int’l Crim. Trib. of the
Former
Yugoslavia
Apr.
3,
2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/acjug/en/brd-aj070403-e.pdf (noting that
the Appeals Chamber contemplated applying JCE to larger criminal cases such
as Tadic).
159 See Prosecution and Punishment, supra note 67, art. 10 (stating that
“where a group or organi[z]ation is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the
competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring
individuals to trial for membership therein before national, military or
occupation courts . . . the criminal nature of the group or organi[z]ation is
considered proved and shall not be questioned.”).
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include firm due process guarantees and only involve true
members of the convicted entities, namely: the SS, the SD and
the Gestapo, and the leadership corps of the Nazi Party.160
Although the ICTY and the ICTR kept their position of
applying JCE to attribute criminal liability to high and middle
ranking perpetrators, those tribunals were mindful of the
problems just underlined. The ICTY and the ICTR actually tried
to adapt their original small criminal enterprise JCE theory to
make it applicable to large criminal enterprises.161 In Prosecutor
v. Brđanin, which followed the decision of the ICTR in
Rwamakuba v. Prosecutor,162 the ICTY Appeals Chamber held
that the application of JCE is not circumscribed to small cases. 163
This Chamber reached such a conclusion by considering that
what matters in a basic form of JCE is not whether the person
who physically carried out the objective elements of a specific
crime is a JCE participant, but rather whether that crime
belongs to the common criminal plan or purpose.164 The
Chamber was presided by US Judge Meron,165 and in a
conclusion similar to the Pinkerton Doctrine,166 the Court
160 See IMT, Judgment of 1 October 1946, in 22 The Trial of German
Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal
Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany 449 (1948) (finding the need to safeguard
convicting only certain individuals because of the possibility of a death
sentence); see also Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and
Conspiracy in International Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 1094, 1161 (2009) (stating that as to the Nuremberg trials in the zonal
governments that “the implication was that membership charges would not be
a shortcut to conviction and would certainly not be available against average
complicitous Germans, who would be handled through denazification or not at
all.”).
161 See Neha Jain, The Control Theory of Perpetration in Criminal Law,
12 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 159, 162 (2011) (discussing the ICTY and ICTR adopting
JCE).
162 Rwamakuba v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR72.4, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise to
the
Crime
of
Genocide,
¶
25
(Oct.
22,
2004),
http://www.worldcourts.com/ictr/eng/decisions/2004.10.22_Prosecutor_v_Rwa
makuba.pdf.
163 Brđanin, IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 423.
164 Id. ¶ 410.
165
See generally id. (the Chamber was also integrated by Judges
Shahabuddeen (Guyana), Güney (Turkey), Vaz (Senegal), and Van Den
Wyngaert (Belgium)).
166
See supra Section II.A (discussing the application of liability as
concluded in the Pinkerton Doctrine).
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established that:
In cases where the principal perpetrator shares that common
criminal purpose of the JCE, or in other words, is a member of the
JCE, and commits a crime in furtherance of the JCE, it is
superfluous to require an additional agreement between that
person and the accused to commit that particular crime. In cases
where the person who carried out the actus reus of the crime is not
a member of the JCE, the key issue remains that of ascertaining
whether the crime in question forms part of the common criminal
purpose. This is a matter of evidence.167

By limiting the JCE participants to political and military
leaders who design the common criminal plan and direct their
subordinates to implement such plan, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber accordingly tried to address the problems stemming
from the original JCE in cases of vast criminal enterprises
committed in a broad territory over an extended period of time.
Thus, all the JCE participants belong to political and military
leadership and their relationship is more horizontal than
vertical. Some scholars have referred to this adaptation of the
original JCE as “[JCE] at the leadership level.”168 Moreover, the
ICTY in Prosecutor v. Martić implicitly endorsed this notion by
even introducing some elements of indirect perpetration which,
as explained, is grounded in the “control over the crime”
approach: “[i]t is not required that the principal perpetrators of
the crimes which are part of the common purpose be members of
a JCE. An accused or another member of a JCE may use the
principal perpetrators to carry out the actus reus of a crime.”169
Despite these efforts, it is argued here that such endeavors
are not enough. First, JCE as applied to leadership combines
two competing approaches to distinguish between principals and
accessories, namely, a subjective approach which is intrinsic to
JCE, and a hybrid, or functional approach, that underlies the
Brđanin, IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 418.
See OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 206 (discussing how rank and position
determines your use and duties for the commission of crimes).
169 Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgement, ¶ 438 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
June
12,
2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf (alteration in original).
167
168
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mode of indirect perpetration using an organized structure of
power. The result in this adapted JCE is that the controlling
criterion to attribute criminal liability to senior leaders as
principals is left uncertain. Accordingly, the identification of the
ultimate approach to determine criminal responsibility of senior
leaders was left unclear. Since JCE at the leadership level
departs from the subjective approach, but without completely
adopting the “control over the crime” approach, such an ultimate
criterion may be the shared intent to implement the common
criminal plan with the other high-ranking officers, that the
defendant shares control over the crime with the other JCE
leaders, or even both of them. Such an outcome seems to just
replace previous obscurity in applying the original JCE with
other problems in applying an adapted JCE version at the
leadership level.
Second, the inconvenience of this exercise also stems from
the contents of the case law invoked by the ICTY and the ICTR
to shape the notion of co-perpetration based on JCE at the
leadership level. The jurisprudence invoked by the ICTY and
the ICTR consisted in few post-World War II cases which applied
forms of accessorial liability that have little to do with a doctrine
relating to JCE/principal liability. Due to a terminological
confusion, the ICTR in Rwamakuba v. Prosecutor170 and the
ICTY in Prosecutor v. Brđanin171 inaccurately concluded the
existence of JCE at the leadership level based on the Justice case
and the RuSHA case,172 both decided by the US Military
Tribunal established in Germany after World War II. In the
Justice case, the US Military Tribunal concluded that the
criminal liability of the defendant arises when, among others,
the following conditions are met: “knowledge of an offense
170 Rwamakuba v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR72.4, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise to
the
Crime
of
Genocide,
¶¶
15–25
(Oct.
22,
2004),
http://www.worldcourts.com/ictr/eng/decisions/2004.10.22_Prosecutor_v_Rwa
makuba.pdf.
171 Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 395–404.
172 IMT, Judgement of 3–4 December 1947 (ex. rel. Justice Case), in 3
Trials of Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military
Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany (1947) [hereinafter Justice Case];
IMT, Judgement 10 March 1948 (ex. rel. RuSHA Case), in 5 Trials of Major
War Criminals Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at
Nuremberg, Germany (1948).
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charged in the indictment and established by the evidence . . .”
and “consciously participated in the plan or took a consenting
part therein.”173 Despite the fact that there was some reference
to plans or enterprises, the “knowledge” requirement used in the
Justice case is a lower threshold than the one underlying JCE,
namely, intent or dolus.174 Additionally, the conspiracy charge
was dismissed in the Justice case as the US Military Tribunal
decided to adopt a finding of the IMT, which consisted in that
conspiracy only extended to conspiracy to commit crimes against
peace but not to conspiracy to commit war crimes or crimes
against humanity.175
Another inaccuracy of the ICTR in Rwamakuba v.
Prosecutor was to find that the language used in Article 6(a) of
the IMT Charter is very similar to the language employed in
Prosecutor v. Tadic.176 With regard to the language, neither the
IMT Charter nor the IMTFE Charter were relatively close to coperpetration based on JCE.177 The Charters of the IMT and the
IMTFE contain no distinction between principals and
Justice Case, supra note 172, at 1081, 1093.
See generally id. at 1093–96 (discussing the knowledge requirement
in the Justice case—a non JCE circumstance).
175 IMT, Judgement of 1 October 1946 (ex. rel. Göering Case), in Trial of
the Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal
Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany 226 (1947) (noting that “the Charter does not
define as a separate crime any conspiracy except the one to commit acts of
aggressive war.”); see also Bush, supra note 160, at 1164 (noting that “Control
Council Law No. 10 contained different language about complicity, conspiracy,
and accessorial liability, meaning that that there was a stronger argument
that conspiracy liability, even for conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes
against humanity, was within Law No. 10.”).
176 See Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR72.4, Decision
on the Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Application of Joint Criminal
Enterprise to the Crime of Genocide ¶ 24 (Oct. 22, 2004),
https://cld.irmct.org/assets/filings/ICTR-98-44-1602-GOVERNMENT-IKAREMERA-DECISION-ON-INTERLOCUTORY-APPEAL-REGARDINGAPPLICATION-OF-JOINT-CRIMINAL-ENTERPRISE-TO-THE-CRIME-OFGENOCIDE2.pdf (noting that “[t]he language used in the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, the indictment submitted to that tribunal,
Control Council Law No. 10, and the indictment and judgement in the Justice
Case have much in common with the language used in the Tadić Appeals
Judgement to describe the elements of a joint criminal enterprise.”) (alteration
in original); see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement ¶¶
242, 260 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (discussing
further the Control Council Law No. 10).
177 Justice Case, supra note 172, at 1081, 1093.
173
174
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accessories, and these instruments additionally distinguish up
to four categories on participants in a common plan or
conspiracy178 unlike JCE under which all the offenders are
equally liable as principals (co-perpetrators) to the crimes.179
The Iraqi High Tribunal, when applying JCE-II to large
scale criminal enterprises, arguably erred in affirming that
Saddam Hussein participated in a JCE to further the criminal
objectives of the Iraqi government and had the necessary mens
rea to be held guilty due to his title as the leader of the Iraqi
regime.180 Thus, the Iraqi High Tribunal based its findings not
on the defendant’s individual intent but on his position and even
family relationships.181
In addition to the problematic application of JCE to large
scale criminal enterprises, another major issue on individual
liability when applying JCE and, in particular JCE-III, is the
problem of foreseeability of crimes not agreed upon by the JCE
participants, either early or late-joiners. This is especially
controversial in cases of dolus specialis crimes such as genocide,
crimes against humanity of persecution, and aggression. Under
JCE-III, all the members of a group are held accountable for the
criminal conduct of some members merely because of the
foreseeability of the crimes that are additional to the crimes
originally agreed on.182 This explains why there is consensus to

See Prosecution and Punishment, supra note 67, art.6(c) (stating there
“shall be individual responsibility” for the listed crimes); see also Charter of
the Int’l Mil. Trib. for the Far East, sec. II, art. (5)(c) (listing “[l]eaders,
organizers, instigators and accomplices . . . [as] responsible for all acts
performed by any person in execution of such plan.”).
179 See Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement ¶¶
117–19 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/acjug/en/fur-aj000721e.pdf (noting the
previous Appeals Chamber decision that, “the common plan or purpose may
materiali[z]e extemporaneously and be inferred from the fact that a plurality
of persons acts in unison to put into effect a joint criminal enterprise.”).
180
Iraqi High Tribunal [First Criminal Court], 1/E First/2005 of
November 5, 2006, p. 99 (Iraq).
181 Id.
182 See Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11A, Judgement, ¶¶ 83–84
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/martic/acjug/en/mar-aj081008e.pdf (discussing the
lowered mens rea requirement of the foreseeability standard in JCE III).
178
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qualify such standard as neither precise nor reliable,183 and even
regard JCE-III as the introduction of a form of strict liability.184
The foreseeability standard paradoxically makes the sanction of
the accused unforeseeable. JCE-II thus presupposes that the
participant in a JCE must know that the crimes in question
normally take place in the respective enterprise. However, this
does not work in cases where the defendant credibly pleads a
lack of knowledge with regard to foreseeability.
It is argued here that the problems with foreseeability in
JCE-III are that all members of the conspiracy need to be treated
equally, the distinction among participants is destroyed, and
JCE-III artificially forces a conviction that would instead have
to be a conviction based on negligence. This is illustrated in
Prosecutor v. Krstic. Krstic was a commander of the Republik
Sprska Drina Corps. The ICTY Trial Chamber concluded that
“[Krstic] must be considered a principal perpetrator of these
crimes.”185 In application of JCE-III for the genocide in
Srebrenica.186 Nevertheless, the contacts and meetings of Krstic
with higher officers of the Republik Sprska army such as
General Mladic and the foreseeability of the Srebrenica
massacre, which led to the conviction of Krstc under JCE-III,
were considered insufficient by the Appeals Chamber that
instead found Krstc as an aider and abettor.187 The imposition
183 See Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note 139, at 550 (discussing the criminal
prosecution of an individual based on a theory of liability not found in the
Article 25 Rome Statute but found in case law of the ICTY Statute); see also
Ambos, supra note 101, at 174 (describing that adding a knowledge element to
the foreseeability element is not precise or reliable); see also van der Wilt,
supra note 40, at 99 (noting the scope of the Joint Criminal Enterprises are
unclear); see also Cassese, supra note 39, at 122 (arguing whether the mens
rea requirement should be the “subjective foresight” or the “objective
foreseeability”).
184
GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD HOC
TRIBUNALS 292–93 (2005); E. VAN SLIEDREGT, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
INDIVIDUALS FOR VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 106–09,
356–60 (2003).
185
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, ¶ 644 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Aug.
2,
2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf.
186 Id. ¶¶ 486–89 (noting that between July 12 and 15, 1995, members of
the Bosnian Serb Army killed approximately 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and
boys).
187
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 135–44
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004),
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of a harsh sentence does not solve the problem because the
difference between principal and accessories and the exact
determination of criminal liability scope are at stake.188
This situation becomes even more problematic when the
foreseeability standard, imbedded in JCE-III, is expanded to
dolus specialis crimes.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber in
Prosecutor v. Brđanin downgraded the specific genocidal intent
requirement,189 which quintessentially defines genocide, in
order to circumvent notorious evidentiary problems. This was
followed by the ICTY decision in Prosecutor v. Milosevic. In the
latter case, an ICTY Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that a
participant in a JCE III to commit genocide is not required to
have the specific genocidal intent because it is sufficient that the
commission of this crime was “reasonably foreseeable” to him. 190
Therefore, this Chamber distinguished between JCE-I and JCEIII concerning the need of a specific intent shared by all the JCE
participants in JCE-I as opposed to mere foreseeability for
participants who were not directly perpetrating the genocide
under JCE-III. The main argument of the ICTY and the ICTR
about the application of JCE-III to specific mens rea crimes
corresponds to the nature of JCE as another mode of liability
and not as a crime itself.191
In principle, it may be claimed that one thing is the mens
rea of a mode of liability (JCE-III) and another thing is the mens
rea of the crime (genocide).192
However, there is some
contradiction because an accused may not be held responsible
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krs-aj040419e.pdf.
188
See Ohlin, supra note 104, at 82–83 (discussing the concept of
foreseeability in criminal law).
189 Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal, ¶ 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 19, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/040319-2.htm.
190 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for
Judgement of Acquittal, ¶¶ 291–92 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
June
16,
2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/tdec/en/040616.htm.
191
Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, ¶
5.
192 See Elies van Sliedregt, Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to
Convicting Individuals, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 184, 207 (2007) (discussing the
advantages of developing indirect perpetration as a mode of criminal liability).
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for committing a crime that requires special mens rea unless this
can be proved regardless of what mode of liability is employed.
Additionally, the distance between the mens rea of the offender
who committed the specific intent crime and the mens rea of the
other(s) cannot be too large because “the crucial notions of
‘personal culpability’ and ‘causation’ would be torn to shreds.” 193
The ECCC has, however, excluded the application of JCEIII from cases concerning genocide charges because, among
other reasons, it considered JCE-III not to be part of customary
international law at the moment of the Khmer Rouge crimes. 194
Nonetheless, the diffuse contours of the notion of “foreseeable”
crimes led the SCSL to reach even more questionable results.
The SCSL lowered the mens rea requirement for JCE
membership since the SCSL Appeals Chamber considered it
sufficient that JCE members share a lawful common objective
and each one separately “contemplates” the possibility that
crimes might be committed in pursuance of such objective.195
This arguably constituted a violation of the principle of
individual responsibility, and was even qualified as a
nonexistent fourth form of JCE.196
B. “The Control over the Crime” Approach as an Alternative
Modes of liability grounded in the “control over the crime”
approach, in particular indirect perpetration using an organized
structure of power either applied alone or in combination with
co-perpetration, constitutes a better option than JCE to address
individual responsibility issues previously raised.

Cassese, supra note 39, at 122.
Prosecutor v. Chea, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38),
Decision on the Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint
Criminal Enterprise (JCE), ¶¶ 77–83 (May 20, 2010).
195 Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment ¶ 80 (Feb.
22, 2008); see also Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T, Decision on
“Defence Notice of Appeal and Submissions Regarding the Majority Decision
Concerning the Pleading of JCE in the Second Amended Indictment”, ¶ 21
(May 1, 2009) (discussing what Members of the Revolutionary United Front
were being charged with and the requisite liability for the crimes).
196 See Jordash & Van Tuyl, supra note 46, at 604 (discussing the notion
of “common criminal purpose construction,” and how it has been applied
inaccurately in some cases).
193
194
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Indirect perpetration, namely, perpetration through
another person, uses an organized structure of power and
exhibits a solid theoretical structure to capture criminal liability
of high-level perpetrators in contexts of the commission of large
scale and/or systematic international crimes.197 The hallmark of
this mode is the perpetrator’s domination of the human “tool”
who directly executes the crime.198 Nevertheless, this necessary
lack of autonomy of the direct perpetrator would result in that
only non-criminally responsible actors such as a minor, an
insane individual, or a person under duress can be direct
perpetrators, which would make this theory unsuitable for
international crimes because these are almost always
perpetrated by criminally responsible direct offenders.199 To
address this point, the theory of the German Professor Roxin,
which was elaborated with a view to the trial of Eichmann,200 is
of particular importance.
Roxin introduced a consistent
exception via the notion of the organized structure of power that
guarantees the “domination” of the commission of the crime even
when the direct perpetrator is criminally responsible, which is
incorporated in Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute. Indirect
perpetration using an organized structure of power is applicable
provided that two requirements are met: there is a tight
hierarchical structure, and the members of the organization
must be easily replaceable.201
When closer attention is paid to the dynamics underlying
mass criminality, it could be that crimes masterminded by the
“perpetrator behind the perpetrator” or “the man behind the
man” almost always involve a complex apparatus of power at
which normally the direct perpetrators are “fungible”, namely,
any foot soldier unwilling or unable to carry out the crime can
almost be immediately replaced by another one and so forth.
See Jain, supra note 161, at 184–85 (discussing the elements of a
perpetrator’s control over the organization).
198 Roxin 1, supra note 120, at 269–80.
199
See Thomas Weigend, Perpetration Through an Organization: The
Unexpected Career of a German Legal Concept, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 91, 96
(2011) (discussing the actions of indirect perpetration, including the
perpetrator’s “domination of the human ‘instrument’ . . . .”).
200 Roxin 1, supra note 120, at 273.
201 Id. at 272–73; see also Roxin 2, supra note 120, at 199–201 (noting that
there are two components of indirect perpetration).
197
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Therefore, the will of the indirect perpetrator, normally senior
leaders, will be guaranteed and implemented precisely due to
the use of an organized structure. As to the Nazi structure of
power, used by Roxin as an example, some historians and
specialists in holocaust studies such as Raul Hilberg have
concluded that the German bureaucracy, especially during the
last stages of the holocaust, worked without being ordered or
pressured as everybody knew what to do and the objectives.202
Be that as it may, indirect perpetration using an organized
apparatus of power made its debut at an international criminal
tribunal in Prosecutor v. Katanga when the ICC found that the
“control over the crime” amounted to “control over the
organi[z]ation.”203 The ICC determined that the requirements of
indirect perpetration now includes the existence of an apparatus
of power, within which the direct perpetrator and indirect
perpetrator operate and which, in turn, enables the indirect
perpetrator to secure the commission of the crimes.204 By
quoting Roxin, the ICC established that:
While his power of control over his own actions is unquestionable,
the [direct] perpetrator is nonetheless, at the same time, a mere
gear in the wheel of the machinery of power who can be replaced
at any time, and this dual perspective places the intellectual
author alongside the perpetrator at the heart of events. 205

Also, ICC Trial Chamber II in Prosecutor v. Katanga
referred to and explained in detail the theory of “control over the
organi[z]ation” (Organisationsherrschaft), in which the
“perpetrator behind the perpetrator” liability is applicable as a
theory to interpret Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute:
202 See Christopher R. Browning, Spanning a Career: Three Editions of
Raul Hilberg’s Destruction of the European Jews, in 8 LESSON AND LEGACIES
191, 194 (Doris L. Bergen ed., 2008) (noting that “Hilberg asserts that this
bureaucracy ‘had no master plan, no fundamental blueprint, no clear-cut view
of its actions.’ Yet . . . the German administration knew what it was doing.”).
203
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, ¶ 500 (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF.
204 Id. ¶¶ 515–18.
205 Id. ¶ 515 (quoting Claus Roxin, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft 245
(8th ed. 2006)).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/1

48

2019

BRINGING THE BOSSES TO INT’L CRIM. TRIALS

49

This theory is the work of Claus Roxin and appears to be invoked
mostly in scenarios where a crime was committed through persons
bearing criminal responsibility . . . . [T]he theory is consonant with
the foregoing constituent elements of indirect commission, since
exertion of control over an apparatus of power allows control over
the crimes committed by its members; a perpetrator behind the
perpetrator may, therefore, be at work . . . . [T]he Pre-Trial
Chamber held that where a crime is committed by members of an
“organi[z]ed and hierarchical apparatus of power”, “[t]he highest
authority does not merely order the commission of a crime, but
through his control over the organi[z]ation, essentially decides
whether and how the crime would be committed.”
. . . . This key feature of the organi[z]ation, discerned in such
functional automatism, secures the superior’s control over the
crime, irrespective of the members’ identity. 206

As ICC Trial Chamber II in Prosecutor v. Katanga
recognized, the apparatus of power autonomously works and its
existence and survival cannot depend on any personal
relationship between its members since the existence of a “power
structure” (Matchapparat) is necessary.207 Importantly, the
Chamber concluded that Roxin’s theory cannot be reduced
exclusively to bureaucracies similar to those of the Third
Reich.208 Therefore, a senior leader that commits a crime and
becomes a perpetrator or a principal does not need to physically
carry out the objective elements of that crime because it is
sufficient that these elements are physically carried out by a
person who the senior leader uses as a tool to execute the
crime.209 An additional example of the ICC’s practice can be seen
in the arrest warrant against the Sudanese President Al Bashir
which stated that indirect perpetration was present using an
organized structure of power and thus establishing liability.210
206 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment pursuant
to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶¶ 1404–05, 1409 (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04025.PDF.
207 Id. ¶ 1409.
208 Id.
209 Eser, supra note 8, at 709.
210 See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on
the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶¶ 209–23 (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01517.PDF (finding that Al Bashir is alleged to
be “criminally responsible under article 25(3)(a) of the Statute for committing
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In addition, indirect perpetration using an organized
structure of power is flexible enough to be combined to better
reflect the reality of criminality at large scale. For example, in
Prosecutor v. Katanga, the ICC employed jointly indirect
perpetration using an organized structure of power and coperpetration giving way to “indirect co-perpetration”211 as the
only feasible manner to accurately depict the real scope of the
criminal liability of the two defendants as principals. The ICC
used this combination since even though Katanga and Ngudjolo
Chui acted with a common plan (co-perpetration), each codefendant led his own organization, and some of the individuals
within each structure of power only accepted orders from the
leader of their own ethnic group who could be described as:
An individual who has no control over the person through whom
the crime would be committed cannot be said to commit the crime
by means of that other person. However, if he acts jointly with
another individual—one who controls the person used as an
instrument—these crimes can be attributed to him on the basis of
mutual attribution.212

Other factual scenarios may be better examined via the socalled “joint indirect-perpetratorship.”213 Unlike “indirect coperpetration”, which involves more than one criminal
organization, joint indirect perpetration involves “only one
(criminal) organization led and dominated by (various) co-

genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes through the ‘apparatus’ of
the State of Sudan . . . .”).
211
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, ¶ 490 (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF; see OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 302–
30 (describing how indirect co-perpetration has developed in cases including
the Katanga case); see also Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-05-87-PT,
Decision on Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Indirect CoPerpetration, ¶ 25 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tdec/en/060322.htm (finding that “in
order to come within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, any form of responsibility
‘must be provided for in the Statute, explicitly or implicitly’, and ‘must have
existed under customary international law at the relevant time.’”).
212
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, ¶ 493.
213 See Ambos, supra note 8, at 997–98 (discussing the applicability of
assessing a scenario under a joint indirect-perpetration theory).
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perpetrators acting with a common purpose.”214 In the practice
of the ICC, the Ivorian politician leader Blé Goudé was charged
with the perpetration of the alleged crimes jointly with both the
former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo and Gbagbo’s inner
circle.215 This means that Goude was accused of having
“exercised control, jointly with the other co-perpetrators, over
the pro-Gbagbo forces, which were organi[z]ed and hierarchical
in nature and through which the crimes charged were
committed.”216
At the domestic level, the Junta Trial case in Argentina and
the German Border case illustrate this type of situation related
to “joint indirect-perpetratorship.” In the Junta Trial case, the
Federal Court of Appeals of Argentina found that members of
the military dictatorship known as “Junta,” who ruled Argentina
from 1976 to 1984, controlled and commanded a machinery of
power whereby members of armed and security forces tortured,
murdered, and disappeared civilians who were considered
subversives.217 In the German Border case, the German Federal
Supreme Court found the leaders of the German Democratic
Republic responsible for homicide as indirect perpetrators by
using an organized structure of power that involved border
guards who shot citizens that tried to flee to West Germany. 218
The application of indirect perpetration using an organized
power structure controlled by several individuals has also been
used in the prosecution of senior leaders of non-state armed
groups. For example, the Peruvian Supreme Court in Abimael
Guzman found the leaders of the Maoist Shining Path
Movement-Peruvian Communist Party to be guilty as indirect
perpetrators of widespread and systematic murders and

Id. at 998.
Prosecutor v. Blé Goudé, Case No. ICC-02/11-02/11, Decision on the
confirmation of charges against Charles Blé Goudé, ¶ 137 (Dec. 11, 2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_05444.PDF.
216 Id. ¶ 149; see also Ambos, supra note 8, at 998 (discussing further the
elements of a joint indirect-perpetratorship theory).
217
Cámara Federal de Apelaciones [CFed.] [federal court of appeals],
09/12/1985, “Prosecutor v. Jorge Rafael Videla,” (1985) (Arg.).
218
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 3, 1992,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN STRAFSACHEN BGHSt 39, 1
(Ger.) translated in Raymond Youngs, Sourcebook on German Law
(Cavendish, 1994).
214
215
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terrorist acts committed during the Peruvian armed conflict.219
Although ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I in Prosecutor v. AlBashir implied that there were indirect co-perpetrators,220 this
may be questioned.221 In any event, the Chamber in Prosecutor
v. Al-Bashir employed indirect perpetration using a structure of
power as a mode of attribution of criminal liability. This makes
sense because there was only one criminal organization led by
Al-Bashir who was a standalone figure in full control of the
alleged structure of power organized to supposedly commit
crimes in Darfur.222 This approach was also employed by the
Peruvian Supreme Court in the 2009 judgment in the case
against former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori. 223
Fujimori was convicted of acts categorized as crimes against
humanity due to his role as an indirect perpetrator controlling
an organized structure of power that involved the use of a
paramilitary group that murdered and tortured civilians
considered subversives or terrorists.224 In 1998, Justice Baltazar
Garzón (National Audience of Spain) invoked similar reasoning
by issuing a committal for trial decision against the ex-Chilean
President Augusto Pinochet, who ruled Chile from 1973 to 1990;
Pinochet allegedly controlled an apparatus of power to commit
systematic and widespread torture, murder, and enforced
disappearance of political and ideological opponents.225
219
Att’y Gen. v. Guzman, R.N. No. 5385-2006, Judgment, § 4.5.8–5.2
(Crim.
Chamber
II
of
the
Sup.
Ct.
Nov.
26,
2007),
https://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/DomCLIC/Docs/NLP/Peru/GuzmanRe
inoso_CorteSuprema_Sentencia_13-10-2006.pdf.
220 Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan
Ahmad
Al
Bashir,
¶
216
(Mar.
4,
2009),
https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01517.PDF.
221 Ambos, supra note 8, at 998.
222
Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecution’s
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶
222.
223 Att’y Gen. v. Fujimori, Exp. No. A.V. 19-2001Barrios Altos, Case No.
AV 19-2001, Judgement, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement
Cases,
¶¶
718–48
(Sup.
Ct.
of
Peru
Apr.
7,
2009),
https://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/DomCLIC/Docs/NLP/Peru/Fujimori_S
entencia_7-4-2009.pdf translated in Aimee Sullivan, The Judgement Against
Fujimori for Human Rights Violations, 25 Am. U. L. Rev. 834, 834-42 (2010).
224 Id.
225 Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 38 I.L.M. 68 (Q.B. Div’l Ct. 1998); R
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Accordingly, indirect perpetration grounded in the “control
over the crime” approach is sufficiently flexible to accurately
capture the criminal liability of leaders. As discussed, possible
scenarios include: i) cases of a single senior leader; ii) cases
where there are several senior leaders acting as co-perpetrators
but each one controlling his/her own structure of power; and iii)
cases in which the structure of power of one criminal
organization is jointly controlled by two or more high-ranking
perpetrators.
The combination of indirect perpetration using an organized
structure of power and co-perpetration is flexible and coherent
as the modes of liability employed follow the same approach,
namely, “control over the crime” unlike attempts by the ICTY to
complement JCE with some elements from the “control over the
crime” approach. This proved to be unconvincing as it merged
two competing approaches. As analyzed, the “control over the
crime” approach thus applied portrays the complex dynamics in
large criminal enterprises both at a horizontal level (coperpetration) and at a vertical hierarchical level (indirect
perpetration). The reality of modern bureaucracies, which
engage in mass criminality and rely on the functional division of
labor, is therefore appropriately reflected.226
Third, indirect perpetration either applied alone or in
combination better guarantees the respect for the principles of
legality and individual criminal responsibility. Some case law
of the ICTY invoked the vague concept of “substantial”
contribution in order to decrease the uncertainty related to the
subjective approach employed by the ICTY.227 Conversely, the
v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte,
3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L. 1998) annulled by R v. Bow Street Metropolitan
Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2), 2 W.L.R. 272 (H.L.
1999); R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte, 2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L. 1999); see also Michael Byers, The Law and Politics
of the Pinochet Case, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 415, 416–23 (2000)
(discussing Pinochet’s accusations in Spain and background of legal
proceedings).
226
See ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST 98 (1989)
(noting when the means are dissociated from the moral ends of using violence).
227 See Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 95–
97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. of the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/tjug/en/kvo-tj011002e.pdf (discussing the
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ICC has applied a higher threshold because one of the objective
elements of co-perpetration based on joint control over the crime
is that the contribution to the crime be “essential.”228 Under
Article 30 of the ICC Statute, the subjective element of the
crimes requires the intent to commit the crime and relevant
knowledge. This high threshold guarantees the afore-mentioned
principle, which holds importance since the commission of a
crime as a principal entails the highest degree of individual
criminal responsibility and must be construed narrowly.229
Concerning criminal responsibility of senior leaders, modes of
liability grounded in the “control over the crime” approach
presupposes a sort of “(normative) control over the acts imputed
to them and a mental state linking them to these acts, thereby
complying with the principle of culpability.”230

CONCLUDING REMARKS
Overall, “the control over the crime” as reflected in the
practice and law of the ICC is a better approach than a subjective
approach underlying JCE. Nevertheless, as Fletcher has noted,
this is neither the beginning nor the end of the story.231 Certain
concerns may be raised about how a theory originally framed for
a very rigid state apparatus with a high level of hierarchical
control (Nazi Germany) can work in contexts such as noninternational armed conflicts in Africa with non-state actors
where such “mechanization” seems to be weaker and the
structures of power are more informal. However, the ICC has
been aware of those limitations and has applied the indirect coperpetration in those contexts.232 Concerning some obstacles
massacre of Muslims from Hambarine).
228
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, ¶¶ 522–26 (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF; see also Prosecutor v. Lubanga,
ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶¶ 343–48
(Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF
(providing an example where court demonstrates higher threshold).
229 WERLE, supra note 8, at 170.
230 Ambos, supra note 101, at 183.
231 George P. Fletcher, New Court, Old Dogmatik, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
179, 190 (2011).
232 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶
519; see also Stefano Manacorda & Chantal Meloni, Indirect Perpetration
Versus Joint Criminal Enterprise: Concurring Approaches in the Practice of
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related to evidence of the requirement of “interchangeability” of
direct perpetrators in the African context, the ICC suggested
that an alternative means to secure automatic compliance with
the orders of the leaders may be through “intensive, strict, and
violent training regimes. For example, by abducting minors and
subjecting them to punishing training regimes in which they are
taught to shoot, pillage, rape, and kill . . . .”233 Another concern
is the vagueness of the “domination” notion and whether this is
a factual or a normative concept.234
Be that as it may, the “control over the crime” approach
should be used by future international and hybrid criminal
tribunals when trying the most responsible, namely, senior
leaders, in contexts of large-scale crimes. In conclusion, this
approach, and in particular the indirect perpetration controlling
an organized structure of power, is more advanced than JCE.
This conclusion is formulated despite the fact that the said
approach has some imperfections that judicial institutions such
as the ICC must correct as much as possible. This is important
because there is a need to adopt a more consistent legal
approach. Even more importantly, this is necessary because
there is a need to accurately reflect the real dimensions of the
roles of the highest level offenders as principals in scenarios of
massive commission of the worst international crimes, and in
strict respect for the rights of the accused, the principle of
legality, and the principle of individual criminal responsibility.

International Criminal Law?, 9 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 159, 171–72 (2011)
(discussing the ways in which the “control over the crime” approach is superior
to JCE).
233 OLÁSOLO, supra note 8, at 124.
234
See Weigend, supra note 199, at 104–05 (discussing the murky
difference between influencing and dominating others).
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